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Against the backdrop of South Africa’s political transition from Apartheid to a 
democratic system of governance during the early 1990s, the South African military 
underwent a distinct transformation of its own. During the military’s transition seven 
disparate forces that had previously been vying for power were integrated under one 
umbrella organization and re-branded as the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF). Scholars and analysts generally consider this process to have been successful; 
it was a seminal achievement by both the negotiating parties and the Government of 
National Unity. Looking at the transformation process during two distinct periods, 1990 
through the national elections of 1994, referred to as ‘the planning phase,’ and post- 
elections through 1996, referred to as ‘the implementation phase,’ this study seeks a more 
robust and nuanced accounting of the factors that contributed to this outcome.  
 
Building upon an evaluation of the existing literature, this study also analyzes the impact 
that the strategies employed by the negotiating parties had upon outcomes. It offers the 
novel approach of analyzing the military’s integration through the lens of negotiation 
theory rather than more conventional theoretical lenses. In doing so, this study aims not 
only to contribute to a common understanding of the means by which the SANDF was 
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Working with the Enemy: 
The Military Integration Process in Transitional South Africa 
and Factors that Shaped a New Defence Force 
“If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your 
enemy. Then he becomes your partner.” 
-Nelson Mandela
Chapter One: Introductory Chapter 
Introduction 
Amidst the tumultuous reformation of the post-Apartheid South African government in 
the late 1990s, South Africa's military landscape evolved from a collection of disparate 
armed forces vying for power into a single unified national military. Scholars and 
analysts generally consider the establishment of the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF) in 1994, and the military integration that ensued, to be relatively 
successful1; it was a seminal achievement by the major parties involved during the pre-
1994 period, and by the Government of National Unity (GNU) after 1994. The reality is 
that the transition process itself was fraught with obstacles from the very start and its 
eventual resolution was neither optimal nor equal for all parties involved. South Africa’s 
transitional government faced a myriad of challenges with respect to its military, though 
two stand out as uniquely consequential.  
First, the military had to unite seven separate forces: the South African Defence Force 
(SADF); two liberation armies called Umkhonto we Sizwe [MK] and the Azanian 
1 Le Roux (2005); Williams (2002); Ferreira and Henk (2009); Burgess (2008); Frankel (2000) 
6	  
Peoples Liberation Army [APLA]; and four independent homeland armies called the 
Transkei Defence Force [TDF], the Bophuthatswana Defence Force [BFD], the Venda 
Defence Force [VDM], and the Ciskei Defence Force [CDF]. Unique cultures, command 
structures, and missions characterized each of these entities. Second, the transitional 
government had to redefine its entire defence and security strategy, which had prioritized 
national security and significant defence spending under the Apartheid regime, in order to 
align itself with the interests and priorities of the new majority rule system. 
Less than a decade after the African National Congress (ANC) was unbanned by 
President F.W. De Klerk, the South African military had made significant progress. It had 
transformed from a white-dominated independent entity into a regulated, professionalized 
force on a path towards becoming racially representative and with a mission that 
supported the interests of South Africa’s national majority.2  
This study seeks to identify the factors that enabled the achievement of military 
integration against great odds, led by the ANC and MK on one side and the National 
Party (NP) and the SADF on the other, both under a newly established Government of 
National Unity (GNU). It divides the integration process into two distinct periods: 1990 
through the national elections of 1994, referred to as ‘the planning phase,’ and post- 
elections through 1996, referred to as ‘the implementation phase’ of integration.  
The results of this study determine that during both periods the transitional government 
identified and accepted significant tradeoffs in order to ensure the stability of the military 
and the nation's long-term security objectives. More broadly, this study offers the novel 
approach of analyzing the military’s integration through the lens of negotiation theory 
rather than the more conventional theoretical lenses that pervade existing literature on the 
subject. In doing so, this study aims not only to contribute to a common understanding of 
the means by which the SANDF was created and shaped, but also to broaden the scope 
and depth of military integration theory itself. 
2 Le Roux (2005) 
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This chapter first presents the research questions that guide this study. It follows with a 
review of the literature on South Africa's military integration and suggests why 
conventional scholarly accounts and the explanations they offer are often incomplete 
(during both the planning and implementation phases). The chapter then presents the 
author's hypotheses to explain outcomes and provides the theoretical underpinnings of the 




This study seeks answers to the following questions: 
 
(a)  What role did the ANC/MK and NP/SADF negotiating strategies play in the 
creation and subsequent integration of South Africa’s post-Apartheid military? 
 
(b)  How did both parties devise and maintain a relatively stable and sustainable 




A sizable literature attempts to explain the outcome of South Africa's military integration 
as dependent upon one among a myriad of influential factors, including but not limited 
to: the impact that Apartheid governance and the SADF had on the SANDF’s structure 
and mission;3 the SANDF's strategic and economic resources at the time of its inception;4 
and the influence exerted by the international community and other external actors.5 
Some of these factors do indeed constitute necessary and fruitful areas for study, while 
others receive inadequate analysis and exploration. Within this dense literature, two 
common analytical oversights persist.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Frankel (2000); Vrey (2004) 
4 Winkates (2000) 
5 Heinecken (2005); van der Waag (2010) 
8	  
First, scholars often conveniently treat the military integration and democratization 
processes as one and the same. As a result, analyses of the integration process become 
conveniently but inappropriately subsumed within the democratization process. The 
creation and integration of the SANDF occurred concurrently with the state’s 
transformation from the Apartheid system into a full-fledged constitutional democracy, 
and for good reason; the two transitions exerted strong influence upon one another. 
However, this influence does not and should not necessitate consideration of them as a 
singular phenomenon. In general, military transitions and their impact upon the historical 
trajectory of nations are narrower in scope than national democratization processes, and 
are also rife with subtleties that distinguish them as such. Krebs (2004) asserts, "Whether 
the military can remake individual (nations') fundamental identity commitments is a 
questionable proposition on its own terms, but such mechanisms are inadequate as 
explanations for the construction and reconstruction of political communities."6 The 
study of the history of military transitions proves that they do not always lead to, or result 
in, political transformations at the national level.  
In the South African case political transformation engendered or necessitated a military 
transition; the new SANDF was fashioned as an instrument of a democratically elected 
legislature. However, the major objective of the negotiating parties wasn’t just to ensure 
the military reflected the will and makeup of the majority, but was also to ensure it was 
controlled by and responsive to the civilian government. Whereas the SANDF was 
meant, from its inception, to serve as an extension of the newly formed civilian 
government, the SADF had for a long time existed as a separate entity, distinct from the 
NP and often acting on its own accord. Thus, as will be shown, while the creation of the 
SANDF was very much a direct manifestation of democratization occurring in South 
Africa, the country’s military integration was in many ways an independently imperfect 
process. 
In this regard, Kenkel (2006) observes that, "defence issues (during South Africa's 
democratization process) received particular attention because it was in this area that the 
6 p.120 
9	  
normative turnaround from white minority to democratic majority was evident."7 While it 
is true that the racial aspect of military integration increased both domestic and 
international awareness about the process, this hardly suggests that the stakes, processes, 
and objectives of democratization and integration were identical. Democratization 
required an immediate transformation of government. The outcome of the election held 
on April 27, 1994, necessitated a swift and complete overhaul of the executive and 
legislative branches and immediate implementation of the interim Constitution. The 
integration of the nation’s military was, by comparison, deliberately gradual. Cawthra 
(2000) points out that "The onset of the negotiations, and the realization by the ANC that 
it would inherit the existing South African Defence Force into which the MK would at 
best be integrated, and possibly assimilated, led to a requirement for new policy options 
to be explored."8 Kenkel (2006) similarly points out that the ANC's "lack of a viable 
defence policy" and "insufficient capacity to produce adequate policy options" led to a 
"power vacuum" that allowed insights from the academic community and civil society to 
creep into the defence policy process over time.9 Other scholars have agreed with this 
assessment.10  
As a result, though the ANC swiftly adopted a "New Approach to Security"11 its 
approach to restructuring the military was by comparison slower and implemented 
incrementally. The Military Research Group (MRG) was established in 1991 and had a 
"long-term goal" to "prioritise future areas of co-operation."12 The MRG, in particular 
Laurie Nathan and his framework for a new defence strategy in The Changing of the 
Guard (1994), played a significant role in shaping the 1996 White Paper on Defence, 
released two years after the SANDF was formally established. Subsequently Vrey (2004) 
points out that "the Defence Review (1998), the Military Strategy (2001)… the 1996 
Defence White Paper, and the 2004 Defence Budget Vote represent prominent indicators 
of an ongoing maturation process"13 of the new military force. 
7 p. 11 
8 p.51 
9 p.13 
10 Shaw, 232-3 (Kenkel 2006) 
11 ANC (1992), Q.2. 
12 Kenkel (2006) 
13 P.89 
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Thus, the error of subsuming integration under the broader democratization process 
results in scholarship 'losing sight of the trees because of the forest.' The military's 
relatively peaceful and incremental integration throughout the 1990s was, in many ways, 
distinct from the government transition and remarkable in its own right. 
 
A second scholarly oversight is the general paucity of attention paid to how the ANC’s 
strategies and tactics impacted the outcome of the integration process. In between De 
Klerk's reinstatement of the ANC in 1990 and ratification of the Constitution in 1997, 
power dynamics and the political landscape shifted. At the period’s outset the landscape 
was dominated by two diametrically opposed parties, one statutory and the other 
insurgent, and by it’s conclusion that same insurgent party held firm (and legitimate) 
control over the government and its future. Some scholars purport that the SANDF 
emerged as an organic and perhaps inevitable result of the political negotiations, but a 
more nuanced analysis reveals that the ANC's approach to military integration was deftly 
calculating. Early on in the process the ANC made concessions to its rivals out of 
weakness, but over time it gained legitimacy and strength and managed to maneuver 
itself into a position of dominance vis a vis the SADF. The ANC maintained a 
perpetually strategic approach to military integration that ultimately paid off; it was able 
to ensure, against considerable odds, that the former statutory forces never mutinied. This 
in and of itself constituted a remarkable achievement. 
 
In terms of broader military objectives and strategies, the ANC also faced greater 
pushback and adopted a more strategically balanced approach than many scholars 
acknowledge. Ferreira and Henk (2009), and others14 suggest that South Africa's post-
1994 focus on human security as the dominant paradigm for its defence strategy was 
inevitable because of the history of Apartheid and the SADF.15 According to this 
narrative, human security emerged as the result of lessons learned during a period of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Williams “Human security and the transformation of the South African national security environment from 1990-2004: Challenges 
and limitations” 
15 Ferreira and Henk (2009) write, "Human security values already were part of the framework of local South African civil society, 
derived from the powerful relationships of family, local community, and local churches and the socialization these produced. 
Arguably, without this base, it is doubtful that human security would have resonated as strongly with South African society or have 
been so readily endorsed by the new government," 521.  
11	  
"corrosive internal strife"16 and severe economic and social difficulty. The concept was 
embraced by the post-1994 ANC government, which was particularly weary of the 1993 
UN Human Development Report’s assessment of South Africa, and was then manifested 
as an "agenda to inform [the government’s] domestic and foreign policy."17 This report 
reflected the post-Cold War world's prioritization of individuals’ safety over that of 
nation states, as well as the socioeconomic advancement of local communities. Ferreira 
and Henk (2009) point out that the belief that sovereign nations should maintain defence 
postures focused on external threats became increasingly obsolete at this time, across the 
globe (South Africa included). However they fail to recognize that the human security 
paradigm wasn’t the sole determinant of the GNU’s posture, and that other security 
priorities (mostly determined by politicians) eventually subsumed it.  
Le Roux (2005) maintains that the 1996 White Paper defines the primary function of the 
SANDF as being “to defend South Africa against external military aggression,” and 
argues that the SANDF “should be designed mainly around the demands of this primary 
function."18 Le Roux (2005) argues that this stemmed from "a marriage of convenience 
between unlikely parties."19 In this scenario the ANC's interest in maintaining an 
'apolitical' force that stayed out of domestic affairs, combined with the SADF's interest in 
re-equipping the newly formed SANDF, led both sides to conclude that privileging 
'defence against external threat' above all else (including the human security paradigm) 
was the prescient thing to do. As a result, Le Roux asserts that the "current demand for 
the SANDF in African peace missions (one extension of the human security paradigm) 
was simply not formally envisaged"20 at the time. Nearly a decade after the Defence 
White Paper’s publication, "the SANDF continues to budget and plan for its primary 
function, but is deployed extensively in operations other than war."21 So though the ANC 
always prized the human security paradigm, it had the strategic foresight to realize that 
phasing in elements gradually, over time, might be a better approach than implementing 
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Other analysts such as Heinecken (2005) have touched on aspects of the fluid power 
dynamics at play during this time, with references to things like the "changing strategic 
environment."22 She points to the fact that, while certain structural elements of the 
SANDF remained intact under the new leadership, the defence budget was reduced from 
4.3% of GDP in 1990 to 1.6% of GDP in 1998. Resource allocation was extended to 
include support for the South African Police Service (SAPS) and other government 
offices for the purposes of various internal 'support the people' missions as well.   
 
Africa (2011) proposes that, "the opening of political space in the 1990s … made it 
possible to place the reform of the security sector on the political agenda.”23  She 
acknowledges that putting reform on the agenda is distinct from actually achieving 
reform. She also points out that "leaders had to move decisively to align their armed 
followers with the policy decisions made in pursuit of peace."24 Towards this end, the 
parties involved in the defence review process employed a number of tactics, including 
"extensive consultation and formation of coalitions and alliances, transparent decision 
making; strategies to deal with those in opposition; use of state machinery and powers to 
facilitate changes that would enhance the peace process..."25 Though Africa’s analysis 
(2011) sheds light on these tactics, she offers little by way of application to the actual 
negotiations themselves. These negotiating strategies and their impact on the integration 
process serve as the intended foci for this study's investigation and analysis. 
 
Integrative Negotiation: An Alternative Theoretical Explanation and 
Justification of Study 
 
Leading up to the 1994 elections and during four subsequent years of military integration, 
ANC and MK leaders repeatedly demonstrated willingness to allow the SADF a seat at 
the negotiating table and a hand in restructuring the armed forces.26 At first glance this 
approach appears conciliatory, and perhaps indicates inherent ANC weaknesses; the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 p.75 
23 Africa (2011): 3 
24 p.27 
25 p.10 
26 Burgess (2008): 77-79 
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ANC and its military wing MK did indeed suffer considerable deficiencies. As Williams 
(2006) notes, MK suffered from limited numbers of personnel due to the fact that many 
of its leaders (including Chris Hani and Tokyo Sexwale) defected; some by death and 
others by choice.27 The SADF was significantly larger, better equipped and resourced, 
more organized, and more experienced in terms of managing domestic and foreign 
security threats. 
 
Deficiencies in MK and ANC ranks, however, do not exclusively account for the 
privilege the SADF’s so-called ‘old guard’ enjoyed, or the subsequent success of 
integration. Shubin notes that though MK was in fact weaker than the SADF, "'weaker' 
could hardly be used as an equivalent of 'smaller' and in any case the strength and 
weakness of one or another military formation cannot properly be measured if it is taken 
out of context of its political ties and popular base."28 The reality was that the ANC was 
coming into power whether the NP and SADF agreed to it or not. De Klerk had unbanned 
the ANC, along with other political parties, and had released Nelson Mandela in 1990 
with the intent to establish a new South African government that quelled violence at 
home and satisfied criticism levied by the international community. Though the NP 
initially envisaged a potential power-sharing arrangement, the international consensus so 
strongly favored a majority-rule system of governance that it was ruled out; if 
negotiations failed to produce a majority-rule outcome and conflict resumed, the 
likelihood was that external forces would intervene. During the five years that preceded 
establishment of the GNU alone, approximately 10,000 people had died and more than 
30,000 had been internally displaced.29 None of the parties to the transition, nor the 
external monitors, would accept a return to such a level of instability.  
 
Knowing that negotiations would inevitably produce a majority-rule system that enjoyed 
the support of the international community, the ANC could easily have adopted a more 
aggressive stance on the negotiations, especially concerning the structure and mission of 
the new national force. The ANC chose instead to adopt a considerably more nuanced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ellis (2013): 68 
28 Shubin (2001) 
29 Haysom (1992)  
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strategy, one that entailed concessions early on, but paved the way for a reversal of 
fortune in the future. Frankel asserts that "all knew deep down that after a diplomatic 
period of time when the ANC had consolidated its power base – be it three years or five – 
MK would inevitably begin to make the necessary changes to the military pact as 
circumstances required, no matter how fine-tuned within a wealth of sealed and signed 
documents."30 The appearance of the ANC’s early concessions to the SADF belied a well 
of strategic foresight whose effects were latent by design. As a result, relatively few 
differences were noticeable between the old SADF and newly integrated SANDF in 
1998.31  
 
History has demonstrated that the long-term effects of this approach ultimately paid off, 
for the SANDF slowly and incrementally evolved into the civilian controlled, 'people-
first' type of security force that its creators envisioned. How can scholarship account for 
the SANDF’s success incorporating SADF elements into its structure and mission, while 
managing to continually, incrementally, evolve and progress? How did it become new 
without cleaving all that was old? 
 
Few scholars consider the innate explanatory power that negotiation theory has to offer 
here. Following a rich literature on the subject, Spoelstra and Pienaar (2008) classify 
negotiations by strategy type so that two fundamental, opposing categories emerge: 
distributive and integrative negotiations. Distributive negotiation assumes there is a fixed 
amount of negotiable assets that must be divided between negotiating parties: whatever 
one party gains the other loses (it is zero-sum). By contrast, integrative negotiation 
assumes that the proverbial ‘pie’ to be divvied up is more complex, and that achieving a 
mutually agreeable solution will leave both parties better off than if either attempted to 
achieve a solution on their own. Due to the complex nature of international relations, 
Spoelstra and Pienaar (2008), along with many other scholars, suggest that integrative 
negotiation is more commonly applicable to international politics.32 They explain it as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 p. 42 
31 Heinecken (2005): 80-81 
32 p.8 
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negotiation model in which the parties "have the objective to walk away with at least a 
perception of having gained more than they could through an alternative approach."33  
 
Spangler (2003) similarly defines integrative negotiation as a "strategy in which parties 
(attempt) to find a 'win-win' solution to their dispute" by focusing on "developing 
mutually beneficial agreements based on the interests of the disputants."34 Splanger 
outlines the classic theoretical example of this negotiating strategy, which involves two 
children fighting over an orange. If both children take the position that they want the 
entire orange, their mother will cut the orange into two halves and give one to each child. 
Such is distributive negotiation, in which both children are forced to compromise and 
each receives only part of what she wanted. However, what if in fact one child wanted the 
orange in order to eat its meat, while the other child wanted the orange in order to use its 
peel as a spice for cooking? In this case, both children could have theoretically been fully 
satisfied by splitting the single orange in a constructive (and more strategically nuanced) 
way. In this second scenario, an integrative negotiation would have allowed each child to 
secure all of what she wanted. Drawing on the seminal work on integrative negotiation by 
Fisher and Ury (1987), Spangler (2003) identifies a number of characteristics of 
integrative negotiating that contribute to its success. Broadly, these include 'working 
together to determine who gets what,' 'focusing on the interests rather than positions of 
the participants,' and 'looking for win-win opportunities.'35 Odell and Tingley (2013) add 
that, "negotiations are more successful to the extent that they are efficient by reducing 
process costs."36  
 
Spoelstra and Pienaar (2008) refer to negotiations between South Africa and the Angola-
Cuba alliance that brought an end to the Angolan Civil War as a seminal example of the 
success that can be achieved through integrative negotiating. They describe how "both 
sides, after each meeting, walked away with at least 'something' that they could take back 
to their constituents ... to gain 'face' and make a little bit of progress" under the pretense 
that "disagreement might cause the war to be extended and even escalate, and that would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 p.8 
34 Spangler (2003)  
35 Spangler (2003) 
36 Spangler (2003) 
	   16	  
be much more costly than compromising."37 As the direct result of this negotiating 
strategy, gains and losses for both sides were (for the most part) equalized. This was due 
in large part to the detailed agreements concerning trade-offs in terms of troop 
withdrawal and financial assistance that would follow Namibian independence. In broad 
terms South Africa was assured of future international support, while Cubans and 
Angolans were assured of greater economic progress.38 Additional applications of 
integrative negotiation in international relations abound.39  
 
When applying integrative negotiation concepts to the establishment of the SANDF and 
its integration process, many synchronicities between theory and reality emerge. 
Fundamentally, the parties involved sought coexistence with one another moving forward 
(with the end of Apartheid and the push for democracy, the likelihood of the new nation 
maintaining separate armies appeared improbable), a common starting point for pursing 
integrative negotiation.40 For this reason, it’s likely that "expanding the pie" or reaching a 
"mutual-gain deal"41 on the military's composition was preferable to both sides 
maintaining separate defence organizations. Additionally, both sides had multiple 
interests at stake rather than a single, fixed asset requiring division. Although on the 
surface the asset in dispute appeared to be the military at large, in reality the issues were 
more complex. The ANC's chief concern was that the new military be subject to civilian 
control by government agencies. So long as this interest was secured, ancillary concerns 
including the military's mission, structure, composition, and funding were negotiable 
during the early stages. The SADF maintained a number of interests in these ancillary 
areas. Thus, an integrative negotiation process fit the bill and, as ensuing sections of this 
study demonstrate, proved to be crucial in effecting a smooth transition. 
 
Some analysts might rush to point out that once majority rule was established and the 
new Constitution was in place, the ANC no longer needed to negotiate with the SADF’s 
old guard. This analysis is misguided, however, in both its assessment of the 
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circumstances and its tactical proscription. Though the ANC assumed control over the 
GNU via majority rule, members of the SADF still held an overwhelming majority and 
maintained a preponderance of power within the newly established SANDF. Desertion 
and mutiny were still very much possible under this fragile arrangement; President 
Mandela needed to preserve military loyalty to the interim government. In short, a two-
sided power struggle still existed even after the establishment of majority rule and the 
GNU. Thus, the need for the two parties to pursue mutually beneficial agreements 
continued. Subsequent sections of this study highlight that as a result of this ongoing 
struggle the ANC continued to make strategic concessions to the old guard even after it 
had assumed full control of the national government.  
 
In considering the post-Apartheid military integration process within the context of an 
integrative negotiation framework, this paper also seeks to more broadly contribute to the 
fields of conflict resolution and negotiation theory at-large, by identifying two strategies 
that the negotiating parties (primarily the ANC) consistently made use of prior to and 
during the military’s transition. First, they prioritized achieving broad objectives over 
narrow ones in their initial agreements, allowing for difficult, specific points of 
contention to be hashed out over time; second, they maintained small negotiating teams 
and kept them shielded from public scrutiny. These two strategies employed by the major 
parties during the planning phase and subsequently by the GNU during integration, were 
responsible for much of the success that the process ultimately enjoyed. By maintaining 
broad objectives rather than specific ones, negotiators ensured that symbolic progress 
continued to define the process and that difficult and contested issues did not grind the 
negotiations to a halt. By keeping the number of participants at the proverbial decision-
making table small and isolated from the public, negotiators limited the potential for 
specific issues to become subjects of public criticism and debate before agreements had 
been reached. In this way, national-level public opinion was largely prevented from 
influencing specific outcomes and the public perception of the negotiation process 
remained more positive throughout.  
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Hypotheses 
 
In an attempt to address both of the aforementioned deficiencies in the literature and to 
consider the establishment and integration of the SANDF within the proposed integrative 
negotiation framework, this study offers the following two hypotheses: 
 
(a)   Integrative negotiating by the major parties involved, particularly the ANC, 
played an integral role in the creation of the SANDF and the subsequent 
military transition. The ANC's willingness to maintain certain structural, 
financial, and mission-related elements of the SADF allowed it to ensure that 
South Africa's new national defence force would remain intact in the short 
term and progressively transform into a racially representative, civilian 
controlled army in the long term. 
 
(b)  Two specific strategies, employed by the major parties in the planning phase 
and the GNU in the integration phase, contributed to the swift transformation 
of the military. First, the governing entities maintained broad objectives, 
rather than specific ones, in order to ensure that symbolic progress continued 
to define the process and allow for difficult and contested issues to be sorted 
out over time. Second, the governing entities kept the number of participants 
at the proverbial decision-making table small and isolated from the public in 
order to limit the potential for specific debates and public discontent to derail 
progress. 
 
Here, it is important to address notions of 'success' and 'progress' that are used to 
characterize the military transformation in this study. This characterization is 
undoubtedly subjective and incomplete, providing a broad brushstroke interpretation of 
the struggles and breakthroughs that occurred throughout the process. The 
characterization also perhaps over sells the current state of the SANDF, and the extent to 
which it remains riddled with deficiencies, particularly regarding racial 
representativeness and its ability to execute its mission. Though this characterization of 
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the SANDF is certainly overly simplistic, it is not unfounded within the literature. Le 
Roux (2005) writes that, "despite the difficulties and setbacks experienced, the 
integration process was largely successful and has contributed significantly to the present 
stability and success of the SANDF in its internal and external operations."42 Other 
scholars have expressed similar sentiments, describing South African military integration 
as a model that has been emulated in subsequent post-conflict military transitions and 
even peace building missions.43  
 
When comparing South Africa’s military transition to other transition processes, the 
speed with which it occurred and the results that it obtained can safely be characterized as 
out of the ordinary. Licklider (2015) cites South Africa’s military integration as a model 
for other African nations since the end of the Second World War. He remarks upon the 
fact that it was able to maintain internal integrity while incorporating personnel and 
soldiers virtually one at a time, rather than in tranches or units, without the whole 
operation erupting into conflict. Though studies concerning whether the outcome of the 
integration was a success or failure deserve a separate forum for research and debate, this 
study chooses (for the sake of brevity) to accept assertions made by many in the literature 





Chapter two focuses on the planning period of the military transition, spanning 1990 
through the end of 1993. During this time, preparations for integration were in full swing. 
Closed-door meetings between small teams of negotiating parties led to agreements that 
were broad in scope, but nevertheless kept all sides satisfied enough to continue moving 
towards a unified military and defence apparatus. Specifically, this chapter examines the 
relevant planning documents that formed the basis of the formation of the new SANDF 
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and demonstrates how integrative negotiating can lead to agreements that encourage 
progress and leave room for enough maneuvering that mutual benefit can be achieved. 
 
This study distinguishes between these two periods based on its theoretical interest in 
evaluating the efficacy of integrative negotiations during the South African military’s 
transition and subsequent integration. By demarcating a split between 1990-1993 and 
1994-1996, this author is able to analyze the behavior of the negotiating parties during 
the run up to, and the establishment of, the interim government. It enables the author to 
consider whether the ANC, after its ascendance to power via the interim government, 
continued to rely upon integrative negotiating tactics, or instead moved away from them 
in favor of a hard-line approach (or distributive integration strategy). Ultimately, this 
study proves that even after the ANC assumed control over the means of governance, it 
maintained the same long-term goals; namely, ensuring stability and sustaining 
momentum. 
 
Chapter three considers the politics of integration, and focuses on the integration itself, 
spanning the years 1994 through 1996. During this time, bargaining, compromising, and 
budgeting carry the day. It is shown that the success of both the political and military 
leadership hinged in large part on their ability to reach agreement, however coarse its 
provisional terms. In terms of the new South African democracy that emerges from this 
period, every facet of the new government reflects compromises wrought between 
majority and minority: the interim Constitution itself serving as the ultimate example of 
political bargaining. The first section provides a historical overview of the period 
focusing on the immediate run up to the general election. During these weeks the SADF 
conceded to underwriting the transition in exchange for a significant ANC concession; 
the indefinite delay of restructuring. This constituted significant compromise by both 
parties and demonstrates the impact that an integrative negotiating strategy had in the 
South African case. The second section provides analysis of the implementation of the 
three-phase military integration plan and highlights some of the key concessions the ANC 
made in exchange for longer-term military stability. 
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The final chapter is devoted to considering the implications of this case study for the 
study of military integration more generally, in other parts of the world.  
 
South Africa’s status as a regional economic and political powerhouse, advanced 
development relative to other Sub-Saharan African nations, leadership role in 
international organizations and peacekeeping operations throughout the continent,45 and 
ability to successfully harness domestic infrastructure to increase GDP, have all 
contributed to its contemporary branding as a ‘model nation’ for the African continent. 
Not only has South Africa superseded expectations for Africa, but it has also made itself 
an appealing partner and ally for countries throughout the world. Foreign government 
officials often view the country as a sort of bridge between Africa and the rest of the 
developed world. From this perspective, its military is worthy of examination because 
perhaps its organization and culture can provide clues about the comparative success of 
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This chapter focuses on the planning period of the military transition with a particular 
focus on the 1990 through 1994 time period. The first section provides a historical 
overview of the key military entities that existed at the time, both statutory and non-
statutory, and that were eventually consolidated to form the new SANDF that emerged 
after the 1994 elections. Each of these entities faced prospects for gains and losses 
contingent upon military restructuring. SADF stood to lose its autonomy and the backing 
of the ruling government party, and thus wanted to maintain the strength and resources it 
enjoyed during the 1980s to the greatest degree possible. MK and the APLA stood to gain 
power and influence via the provision of majority rule, but at the same time wouldn’t be 
able to maintain stability without the loyalty of the (much stronger and culturally 
entrenched) SADF. The next section examines the most salient agreements, planning 
papers, and legislation related to the SANDF’s formation and integration.  
 
The subsequent section applies this study’s hypotheses in order to demonstrate that 
integrative negotiation theory does indeed contribute to a more fulsome understanding of 
the planning phase and its historical trajectory. It will also highlight that agreements 
reached during this period mandated very little military restructuring and focused instead 
on broader, longer-term strategic objectives. These agreements delayed implementation 
of some of the most painful restructuring until later points in time, but they fulfilled the 
more important objective of moving the integration process along. The final section of 
the chapter concludes that integrative negotiation theory provides a helpful analytical lens 
through which scholars can better understand the planning phase of South Africa’s 
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Historical Account: Pre-1990 
 
In terms of international politics during the late 1980s, the single issue that shaped the 
global order was the waning of the Cold War and its accompanying ideological mandate, 
and South Africa was not spared involvement. The United States’ Reagan Doctrine 
breathed life into the South African government, and parties on both sides of the 
negotiating table felt the impact of shifting tectonic plates. As the Cold War entered its 
final years and months, the imminent collapse of Eastern European communism provided 
even more urgent incentives for South Africa to orchestrate change.46 This sense of 
urgency included reevaluating the government’s fragmented national security strategy 
during a period in which, as Kenkel (2007) asserts, "it was a rarity for any state's defence 
posture not to be in a state of flux."47 A brief summary of each of the major internal 
forces at this time follows.  
 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) 
 
Since its inception MK fell short of the SADF in terms of force structure, capabilities, 
and resources; MK was outnumbered, possessed insufficient arms, and was under-
prepared in comparison with its primary adversary. At its zenith in the 1980s, MK 
boasted only 7,000 soldiers as compared to the SADF’s 100,000 plus48 (the SADF 
continued to grow annually through the 1970s and much of the 1980s, whereas MK 
leveled off). After an influx of recruits following the 1976 Soweto rebellion, MK troop 
numbers remained consistent for much of the ensuing fifteen years, even though its 
activities proliferated.49 MK also endured the extreme disadvantage of operating in exile 
and, with its high command based in Lusaka, Zambia, faced logistical hurdles in terms of 
moving people and equipment across borders with stealth and efficiency.50 
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During the early 1980s MK participated in a multitude of large-scale attacks intended to 
symbolize their opposition to the NP’s increasingly harsh policies and practices.51 This 
campaign included, most notably: an attack on a SASOL fuel plant that incurred R66 
million worth of damage; an attack on army headquarters at Pretoria 
(Voortrekkerhoogte); the bombing of the Koeberg power plant; and a series of smaller 
car bombings in urban areas targeting groups of military personnel (the so-called Church 
Street bomb in Pretoria figures as part of this series, though it garnered severe criticism 
for the loss of civilian life it unintentionally incurred).52   
 
In the mid 1980s MK reconfigured strategy to focus on rural (rather than urban) areas 
inside South Africa.53 In 1985 MK leadership declared a ‘people’s war’ that served as a 
guise through which it sought direct engagement with the SADF and SAP for the first 
time (prior to this their efforts were self described as armed propaganda, a much more 
limited form of engagement).54 MK’s special operations unit featured prominently during 
this period as it undertook attacks upon the SADF’s nerve centers, the Witwatersrand 
Command and one of their radar satellite stations at Klippen.55  
 
During this time MK was given a series of opportunities to cut its teeth in conventional 
warfare with military engagements that tested its competence and resilience. First, MK’s 
infiltration of the SADF put its intelligence capabilities to the test, and its leadership 
learned the importance of developing intelligence strategy and implementing assets in a 
strategic rather than tactical manner.56 Second was MK’s involvement in its neighbors’ 
affairs; it provided auxiliary assistance to ZIPRA forces in Zimbabwe, FRELIMO in 
Mozambique, and to the MPLA government forces in Angola (in this instance they even 
gained firsthand experience combating the SADF, who were sent in by South Africa to 
back Jonas Savimbi’s regime).57 The collective effect of these experiences was, 
according to Liebenberg, to "provide MK with important combat experience …and 
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helped to build the capacity of its personnel. "58 Despite MK’s increasing presence in 
combat zones, it rarely renounced the humanitarian principles operating at the core of its 
ethics creed and during this time became a signatory to the Geneva Convention of the 
United Nations.59 
 
The South African Defence Force 
 
The story of the SADF is largely one of struggle. As the nation’s primary statutory 
defence force, it expended much of its energy in attempts to delay what was clearly 
deteriorating prowess and legitimacy.60 It is important to point out that there was much 
competition among the SADF’s branches during the lead up to the 1994 national 
elections. Comprised of army, navy, air force, and medical services branches, the SADF 
consisted of a foundation of professional soldiers (a high tech force) and a bulk force of 
conscripts. Many of its operations were marked by tension, inherent in a system in which 
the services were sharply divided by age and experience.61  
 
By the 1970s, the SADF was determined to employ harsher methods to achieve its 
security objectives. In response to the escalating violence that characterized the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the SADF decided to engage any means necessary (whether legal 
or not) to protect against black incursion into territories outside of the homelands. The 
SADF employed heavy-handed measures to monitor and manage the day-to-day activities 
of civilians, and the opaque nature of its operations was aided by the inclusion of 
intelligence branches in its operating structure.62  
 
Towards the end of the 1970s the military’s intelligence arm, the Division of Military 
Intelligence (DMI), was dragged from the periphery of the state’s governing apparatus 
and granted a position at its very core.63 Operating in concert with South Africa’s larger 
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intelligence community comprised of the SAP’s Security Branch and the Cabinet-created 
Bureau for State Security (known as BOSS), DMI was granted special powers (this in the 
wake of concerns about the regime’s security that proliferated as a result of the uprising 
in Soweto). DMI’s special status as a quasi-military force allowed it certain prerogatives 
that, as many anti-Apartheid activists argued, were unconstitutional and infringed upon 
civil liberties in an unprecedented manner. "The most striking feature of the South 
African Defence Force’s Military Intelligence structures was the extent to which they 
engaged in domestic and cross-territorial attacks on anti-apartheid activists, many of 
whom were in exile in banned political organizations ... The apartheid government’s 
1977 White Paper on Defence presented the role of the defence establishment as being to 
uphold the right of self- determination of the ‘White Nation.’ " 64   
 
In order to fulfill this mission, the military employed a range of extreme and illegal 
measures against civilians, including at various times: intimidation; both random and 
targeted arrests and prolonged detentions; beating and torture; the propagation and 
outright instigation of so-called black-on-black violence; political assassinations; and 




The genesis of the 1984 people’s war was a declaration made by MK and the APLA 
(Azanian People’s Liberation Army) in response to "the authoritarian implementation of 
apartheid at all levels of society. "66 Eventually the ANC’s armed wing would prove itself 
considerably more successful than its PAC-bred counterparts, as it became evident that 
the APLA would garner little if any support outside of the Western Cape province, and 
the efforts of the APLA were relegated to the sidelines of the conflict. 
 
The APLA was initially conceived of as a foil for MK. It came into being around 1962 
(under the name Poqo), and thereafter established clusters of loyalists and followers 
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throughout several provinces, to include Natal, the Transvaal, and the Eastern and 
Western Cape provinces. Headquarters were established inside Lesotho. It was not until 
1968 that it switched its name to the Azanian People’s Liberations Army, by which time 
the organization was already beset with internal difficulties.  
 
From the outset the PAC struggled to match the ANC’s success in maintaining 
international operability. Initial attempts were made to set up remote bases in London, 
Accra, Cairo, Francistown, Leopoldville, and Dar es Salaam, with an Algerian location 
added in 1964.67 Despite the establishment of such offices, the APLA soon confronted 
the stark reality that forging meaningful connections between branches was not a simple 
task. For starters, the leadership found it difficult to instill loyalty towards the Maoist 
doctrine in soldiers scattered across the globe.68 Furthermore, as host countries became 
involved in various conflicts of their own during the 1970s and 1980s, APLA forces 
found themselves drawn into the disputes of countries as varied as Angola, Libya, and 
Yugoslavia, which further eroded their own party loyalties. 
 
While some scholars trace the problems of the APLA directly to leadership problems 
within the PAC,69 others point to the disparate training APLA soldiers received and the 
variety of external influences they were subjected to as the result of time spent overseas 
in exile. Terence Jackson and Elize Kotze assert that much of the training the APLA 
forces received came in the form of crash courses in guerrilla warfare, and that 
qualifications for entry were overly lenient when compared with those for MK.70    
 
Regardless of why MK ultimately fared better than the APLA, discrepancies between 
these two political parties’ armed offshoots was obvious. The APLA fared considerably 
better once the ban on opposition parties was lifted by the South Africa government, and 
it began to flourish during the mid to late 1980s. Many APLA operatives based overseas 
returned to South Africa during this time, and the PAC was better able to consolidate 
control over them by managing and coordinating their daily activities and operations. 
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The Homeland Militaries (Bophuthatswana, Transkei, Ciskei, Venda) 
 
Security forces were established for each of South Africa’s four independent homeland 
territories in order to fortify and extend the state’s reach into opposition-led territory. 
Strong links were established early on between each of the homelands’ individual 
militaries and the SADF’s Department of Military Intelligence (DMI).71 Of the four 
militias, only the Transkei Defence Force was directly involved in the negotiations of the 
1990s, due largely to the successful efforts of its leader, General Bantu Holomisa, to ally 




It has been argued that the Apartheid government historically relied heavily upon the 
SADF to support its campaigns and implement its policies, but it wasn’t until the 1980s 
that the SADF’s power actually rivaled that of the state governing apparatus. The western 
democratic model, which stipulates military organizations must be subordinate to civilian 
command and control via government departments and agencies, had long prevailed in 
South Africa as the model of choice.73 Herbert Howe, writing for the journal Modern 
African Studies in 1994, points to Botha’s creation of the ‘military-dominated’ State 
Security Council (SSC) as a watershed moment that indicated the military’s usurpation of 
civilian rule.74 The SSC effectively replaced the Cabinet as the locus of political power 
and decision-making for the duration of the 1980s, and enabled the SADF to extend its 
operations into the domains of domestic counterinsurgency and policing. In this way 
Botha’s Total Onslaught campaign placed the control levers in the military’s hands at the 
expense of the civilian led cabinet. 75 
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Over time, Botha tightened his personal control over the SADF.76 By strengthening his 
relationships with senior military commanders, he managed to both consolidate military 
power within the executive branch and (paradoxically) encourage military encroachment 
into civilian life. Because neither of these developments were – despite legitimate claims 
to historical precedent – entirely constitutional, establishing plausible deniability became 
an immediate priority for those in Botha’s administration. “The S.A.D.F. placed itself, 
under the rubric of national security, beyond the reach of parliament, the courts, 
commissions of inquiry, and even the state's auditors. General Malan defended such 
secrecy on the principle of need-to-know.”77   
 
This rubric proved to be increasingly useful to the administration as it sought more 
opaque means of governance and pursued an end state in which the security services were 
virtually unrestrained when it came to running their operations. Botha began to 
incrementally afford himself, his political appointees, and certain designees within the 




During the early 1980s the SADF started insinuating itself into covert operations, often 
planned and executed in concert with the South African Police (SAP).78 Beginning with 
Operation Hammer in 1983, which resulted in the death of anti-Apartheid activists, the 
SADF adopted covert methods of confrontation with increasing frequency. Over the 
course of the next decade, hundreds of South Africans would perish, often 
indiscriminately, at the hands of this new shadowy defence force.79 Much was made of 
this development at the time, as Seegers (1996) has pointed out, but these initial tactical 
operations proved to be mere precursors to larger, more destructive campaigns.  
 
The issue of South Africa’s security forces conducting covert, possibly illegal operations, 
later came to the forefront of national consciousness in 1992 when, in the midst of 
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speculation about the existence of a malignant ‘third-force’ comprised of members of the 
SADF and the SAP, Botha fired 23 of his top commanding officers.80 Despite the fact 
that Botha did not refer explicitly to the use of such a force when publicly addressing 
these dismissals, his actions indicated that perhaps some of his allegiances had been 
compromised. These actors, whether authorized internally or independently of the official 
chain of command, had been responsible for shootings, massacres, and murders 
propagated on a wide scale against black South Africans, the ANC, and the UDF for 
some time. This topic is deserving of greater analysis than it receives here. Though an in-
depth examination of the alleged third-force is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
mentioned here in order to illustrate the extent to which the military began – under PW 
Botha’s command – to expand the scope and distort the shape of traditional military 
power in South Africa during the 1980s.81 This initial expansion of military powers laid 




All of this activity served to severely undermine the credibility of the SADF, particularly 
its overreach into the government’s civilian affairs, and of Botha himself. When FW De 
Klerk assumed office in 1989, he eliminated the nefarious SSC and replaced it with a 
civilian lead Cabinet for Security Affairs (akin to the Cabinet that had preceded the SSC 
under Botha). Within the first couple of years of De Klerk’s tenure, it was generally 
conceded that he had effectively shrunk the security apparatus of the state – both in size 
and in power. The decreased stature enjoyed by the military was attributable to a 
multitude of factors, including De Klerk’s influence. “South Africa's military-industrial 
complex has been significantly shrunk by De Klerk. His overall policy of reconciliation 
over confrontation scuttled the Government's reliance upon physical force and, thus, 
much of the need for continued support of, and deference to, the security establishment. 
By mid-1992 the military's political influence and its ability to sustain conventional 
operations had been reduced.”82  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Sacks (1992) 
 
82 Howe (1994): 38 
	   31	  
Historical Account: 1990-1994 Elections 
 
During the period spanning 1990 through the 1994 elections, the prospect of military 
integration in South Africa became a tangible reality, as negotiations between the De 
Klerk Administration and the ANC kicked into high gear.83 Faced with this prospect, 
military operatives on both sides of the political divide conducted rounds of contingency 
planning in preparation for the government’s transition. Throughout this period, MK and 
the SADF prepared for transformation, yet also made sure to retain autonomous force-
readiness. 
 
Several key elements emerged as early indicators of what could be expected of the 
defence forces in post-Apartheid South Africa; later on they would re-emerge as major 
themes. Among these were the interim Constitution, in which a new paradigm for civil-
military relations was hammered out and the future of civilian supremacy was codified.84 
“1990 to 1994 was marked by the lifting of restrictions on political organizations such as 
the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). This period 
saw the emergence of transitional forms of control of the security sector as a whole and a 
shifting of the terrain on which the control of the intelligence services was mediated. As a 
by-product of the negotiations process, discussions were initiated about the future of all 
security services – police, defence and intelligence – including security components of 
the liberation movement.”85 
 
Another important element was the proposition of a new defence posture with altered 
budgetary considerations for the entire military apparatus. During this period the national 
posture with regard to defence changed drastically. While the SADF under President De 
Klerk prioritized defence and traditional national security expenditure, the new regime, 
empowered by democratic elections, planned to embrace a human security paradigm in 
which the concept of national security was expanded to include human welfare. In turn, 
military spending was to be constrained.  
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However, these objectives were meant to be pursued gradually and incrementally, which 
was made evident in the proposal for the three-phase transition process introduced by the 
Technical Committee on Violence (though the committee’s report on this plan focused 
primarily on the integration phase), and was agreed to by the ANC and SADF during a 
bilateral meeting in 1993. The plan was subsequently proposed and accepted by the 
multiparty negotiation process (the MPNP) and became a roadmap for the military’s 
transition from that point forward.86  
 
The Three-phase Plan 
 
Between 1990 and 1993 there was much speculation about what a new SANDF would 
and could look like, but it wasn’t until the latter part of the period that these ideas 
assumed more pragmatic form. An assortment of legislation and policy-focused councils 
created a platform for the consideration of the future of the military at the highest levels 
of government, and the three-phase military integration roadmap was born. 
 
The government decided upon this plan because it would provide flexibility but at the 
same time prevent competing defence force contingents from overwhelming or pre-
empting the entire process. Each phase was projected to last between one and several 
years, and would necessitate pre-determined alterations to force demographics. 
 
Every aspect of this plan, from its projected timeline to the manner in which it would be 
managed and monitored, exposed heavy-handed operational intent on the part of the 
government (both executive and legislative branches). It is clear that in spite of the 
rapidly changing political environment, the transitional authorities had every intention to 
maintain strict control over the military during every stage of its transformation. While 
certain elements of South Africa’s transition would be executed with little oversight and 
interference from the governing authorities, the defence force would not be one of them.  
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The initial phase of the plan was termed ‘integration’, and comprised the intake of non-
statutory forces.87 During this phase the existing armies came together formally on paper, 
in a national registry, so that the scope of the new force could be approximated.88 
 
The second phase was referred to as ‘demobilization’, and consisted of a process whereby 
former SADF and MK fighters were given the option to voluntarily depart or retire from 
military service.89 The government intended for this process to whittle down the force 
considerably, though in practice it did not achieve this effect.90  
 
‘Rationalization’ (which is explored in-depth in the subsequent chapter of this study) the 
third and final phase of the transition process,91 was designed to help align the remaining 
force structure with revised force design, and was also the period during which 
retrenchment would begin.92 Chief of the Army Johan Pretorius captured the prevailing 
sentiment of the time when he pessimistically characterized this phase as a “no-win” 
situation for the emergent SANDF.93 (Chapter three provides evidence in support of this 
point and shows that as long-standing members were let go, the new military 
hemorrhaged expertise. Conversely, as former non-statutory fighters were released, the 
new military suffered a tremendous loss of legitimacy in the eyes of both the ruling party 
and the international community).  
 
There is perhaps no stronger example of the presumptive prowess of South Africa’s 
governing elites than the three-phase integration process they designed for the armed 
forces; it laid out a roadmap for the transition of the forces from a motley collection of 
competing interests and individuals into a cohesive, nationalist brand of military force.  
At its core, the military’s transformation was something required of the organization in 
order to accommodate a new political reality. This organizational challenge was of such 
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great magnitude that it not only tested the military’s adaptability but constituted an 
existential threat to its survival. 
 
“First and foremost, defence transformation supports the primary objective of the 
government, which is the transformation of the state towards a new democratic 
society.”94 The three-phase plan laid out in planning documents and in various pieces of 
legislation reflects the negotiating and back-and-forth political wrangling between the 
two primary stakeholder groups vying for dominance. 
 
Transition Agreements and Plans Relevant to the Defence Forces 
 
Negotiations and planning for the military’s transition proceeded during this period in 
anything but a predictable or smooth manner. This section presents an overview of 
important decisions taken that moved the planning process along and ensured that 
progress, however haphazard and intermittent, was made.  
 
At first, a framework for the future of a new South Africa existed only on paper, as a 
series of roadmaps and planning papers, which collectively represented a vague 
alternative future for the country. It was several years before this framework advanced 
beyond conceptual platitudes and became a viable aspiration with discernible features. 
Additional pieces of legislation were added incrementally until the effect of their 
consolidated contributions produced a constitutional framework within which the post-
Apartheid military could survive.    
 
With the Organization of African Unity (OAU’s) adoption of the Harare Declaration in 
1989, political negotiations gained legal legitimacy, something they had not previously 
enjoyed. This was the first major piece of international legislation to be passed that laid 
out a certain future for a negotiated political settlement; it presented options for the 
government to advance, assigned action items to relevant stakeholders, and imbued the 
transition effort with a sense of momentum.  
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After 1989, ensuing agreements related to the military can be categorized according to 
their signatories. On the one hand were agreements reached in South Africa between the 
government in power and the ANC, and on the other hand were those reached ‘during 
multilateral decision-making processes’95 by the South African government in concert 
with multiple external stakeholders.  
 
Bilateral Negotiations with Implications for the Defence Force 
 
The next major agreement reached was the Groote Schuur Minute in May of 1990 
(named for the President’s residence in Cape Town). Between Harare and Groote Schuur, 
however, one major event occurred that merits special mention because it helped to turn 
the tide in favor of pursuing military integration. This was President De Klerk’s lifting of 
the ban on the ANC and PAC in summer of that year, resulting from months of secret 
negotiations with Nelson Mandela.96 The implications of this decision reverberated with 
incalculable force throughout the country. 
 
The Groote Schuur Minute highlights how uncertainty affected defence interests during 
the political negotiations process.97 Though this agreement’s authorization constituted a 
watershed moment, and publicly heralded the launch of negotiations, conflicting defence 
interests beleaguered it from the start (mostly over South African security legislation and 
the fact that it undermined or conflicted with norms established by international bodies of 
law).98  
 
During the weeks leading up to the signature of the agreement, the ANC revealed cracks 
not only along party lines but within its own ranks. The party was rife with disagreement 
over how and when negotiations should commence with the government, and even 
whether they should commence at all.99 At the end of the day, the agreement set forth 
some general parameters for the commencement of military negotiations, though these 
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parameters were more notable for their symbolic value rather than the particulars they put 
forward.100 The main component was contained in paragraph three of the Minute, which 
established a working group intended "to resolve all outstanding questions arising out of 
the decision to suspend armed action and related activities".101 Once signed, the 
agreement stood as the first official joint venture between the government and ANC.  
 
The Pretoria Minute of 1990 followed on the heels of Groote Schuur and was plagued by 
a similar sense of uncertainty, but it also went a considerable way further in terms of 
producing meaningful output.102 This Minute contained two primary clauses with special 
relevance for the defence forces: one which stipulated an end to the state of emergency 
that President De Klerk had kept in place for years,103 and another that paved the way for 
the release of political prisoners and brought the issue of the ANC’s use of violence front 
and center. 
 
The ruling party had maintained a state of emergency in an effort to propagate a legal 
foundation for the detention and imprisonment of activists (an overwhelming majority of 
whom were black South Africans) from previously banned political organizations.104 
Though the burden of enforcing the state of emergency fell primarily to national and local 
law enforcement operatives, violence often erupted that overwhelmed SAP capacity and 
it became routine practice for the SADF to intervene. Thus, maintenance of De Klerk’s 
state of emergency had occupied much of the military’s attention and resources for some 
time, and so when its end came about much of their resources and manpower were freed 
up. 
 
It is notable that Pretoria laid out a timetable for the release of Nelson Mandela and other 
political prisoners throughout the country,105 many whom had been jailed for upwards of 
a decade. This development leant considerable momentum to the overall negotiating 
process, but it had particular significance for the defence forces. Once Mandela and other 
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ANC leaders were released they confronted a backlash by members of the ANC’s 
guerilla army who didn’t want to relinquish violent means of resistance. This opposition 
– mandated by Pretoria in exchange for their unbanning – was vehement and often fierce. 
“Guerilla warfare … had great emotional appeal, as it pitted the strength of an 
underground movement that held high moral ground in the eyes of the country’s black 
majority against what was considered to be an illegitimate and racist regime with superior 
firepower.”106  
 
It was this issue that was most difficult for the ANC to manage at the beginning of 
military integration. This single clause strengthened the resolve of a minority faction that 
felt the party’s leadership was already compromising too much by acquiescing to 
negotiations in the first place, and felt further betrayed by the prospect of relinquishing its 
most effective means of resistance.107 Eventually, proponents of the new terms prevailed, 
and further details pertaining to the ANC’s ceasefire were hammered out in the DF Malan 
Accord during the following year, 1991. 
 
Multilateral Negotiations with Implications for the Defence Force 
 
In September 1991 the majority of South Africa’s political, security, and private sector 
organizations formally adopted the National Peace Accord (NPA); exceptions were the 
PAC, the Conservative Party, and several other high-profile conservative 
organizations.108 Regardless, the NPA was widely considered a success, as it set an 
increased tempo for the transition of the military and established an emphasis on 
consensus building that prevailed during subsequent proceedings. It also contributed to 
the establishment of generally peaceful conditions in cities and during protests. It was 
“the first significant transitional arrangement to lay the basis for the negotiations that 
were to begin in later months … [and] it gave parties greater confidence that multiparty 
conferences could yield agreements.”109  
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The value of the confidence building element inherent in this agreement cannot be 
overstated; it paved the way for what was perhaps the most publicized round of 
agreements to occur during the entire transition period, the Convention for a Democratic 
South Africa (CODESA).110  
 
Thus far in the formal negotiations process, the ANC’s willingness to postpone 
agreements on more complicated issues in exchange for symbolic progress, had been 
crucial to the process’s momentum. Both the government and the ANC appeared 
disposed towards fostering a receptive political climate before actually implementing 
meaningful change (though each had very different reasons for pursuing this approach; 
the government because it hoped to delay meaningful change for as long as possible111 
and the ANC because Nelson Mandela believed that change would only be sustainable in 
the long term with buy-in from the white population).112  
 
Prior to the first round of CODESA, which occurred in December of 1991, the ANC 
rallied all opposition forces – under the aegis of the Patriotic Front Conference – in 
October. Headlined by the ANC, the PAC, and AZAPO (the Azanian People’s 
Organization), this conference was conceived of in order to ensure as much cohesion 
between competing opposition groups as possible, in preparation for their first round of 
direct negotiations with the government. During this conference the consortium agreed to 
move forward with official negotiations (still flying high on the recent success of the 
NPA), which was a significant step.  
 
The first round of CODESA addressed the needs and objectives of the military as part of 
a larger agenda that included everything from the design of the interim government to the 
future status of homeland territories. Here, the idea of including the previously maligned 
non-statutory forces was put forward for official consideration for the first time.113  
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Other crucial decisions taken included those related to defence legislation, such as the 
retention of both the Public Safety Act and Internal Security Act for the duration of the 
transition.114 These and other laws allowed for the military’s (future) success in 
maintaining order during the chaotic and uncertain transformation of the country.  
 
The Multiparty Negotiating Forum (or the ‘third round’ of CODESA) convened in April 
1993115 and produced a watershed piece of legislation called the Transitional Executive 
Council (TEC) Act.116 This act set up the mechanisms that would usher the defence 
forces (and the entire state apparatus) through the remainder of the transition, as well as 
the widgets that would hold it together. The precise wording of the Act was such that a 
transitional governing body was established (the TEC) that could later transform itself 
into a new government.  
 
The particular brilliance of the legislation lay in the fact that it enabled the Council to 
serve this dual function; it served the immediate purpose of propping up the government 
during the negotiations,117 and at a certain point in the future would give way to the 
emergence of a new permanent government. In other words, the TEC put forth in the act 
was adaptive, flexible, and would also alleviate some of the risk inherent in an uncertain 
political climate (and mitigate the perception of a political vacuum surrounding the 
transition). The TEC would later provide more detail to the plans accepted by the MPNP.  
 
The design of the TEC supports the argument put forth earlier in this section, that the 
initial agreements reached during negotiations were somewhat loose and flexible by 
comparison with what came later, and they allowed for more difficult agreements to 
develop incrementally and at a more organic pace.118  
 
Various sub-councils of the main TEC were created to deal with an assortment of core 
focus areas of particular concern to all involved; not surprisingly the military constituted 
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one such focus area, and its equities were divided between the sub-council on Defence, 
the sub-council on Intelligence, and the sub-council on Law and Order, Security, and 
Stability. 119 These councils were each responsible for producing reports covering the 
status quo of their respective constituent organizations, as well as prospects for resolving 
future difficulties. The sub-council on Defence was where issues related to the 
amalgamation of statutory and non-statutory forces were housed. 
 
TABLE 1: THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL120 
 
The Sub-Council on Defence had a number of responsibilities, which included: 
•   To formulate a code of conduct that would bind all military forces, and to monitor observance of the code; 
and 
•   To commission or undertake research into the parliamentary control, composition, manpower policy, 
organization and executive command of the future defence force, and the future of the arms industry. 
 
The Sub-Council on Defence was also charged with the establishment of the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF). 
The NPKF would draw on the security resources of the parties involved in the negotiation process. It was disbanded 
after the 1994 elections, however, and its short existence foreshadowed a number of challenges (i.e. resources, 
command and control, training doctrines and mandate) faced by the architects of South Africa’s new security services. 
Nevertheless, the main lesson that emerged from the NPKF was that integration, however difficult, was possible. 
 
The Sub-Council on Intelligence had powers of oversight and political supervision similar to those of the Sub-Council 
on Defence. It also had the following responsibilities: 
•   To adopt basic principles of intelligence to serve as a basis for the creation of a national intelligence capacity 
in the new democratic system; 
•   To formulate a binding code of conduct for all intelligence components during the transition, which could 
serve as the basis for an official code of conduct in a new democratic dispensation; and 
•   To obtain evaluations of the security situation in the country from the intelligence services. 
 
The Sub-Council on Law and Order, Security and Stability was tasked with the supervision of police performance. 
Responsibilities included: 
•   To establish a national inspectorate composed of the police structures and outside police structures to 
investigate and monitor police agencies’ alignment with the broad objectives of TEC and the transition; 
•   To establish, in consultation with the ministers responsible for the policing agencies, a national independent 
civilian complaints mechanism to be responsible for the investigation of complaints by members of the public 
about possible abuses or misconduct by police agents; and 




Small Working Groups with Implications for the Defence Force 
 
Particularly in the wake of the original Groote Schuur Minute and the first CODESA, 
government officials relied upon small, carefully selected ‘working groups’ to fulfill new 
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mandates and hammer out outstanding defence issues.121 For the most part it was 
members of Parliament, already weary of the incursion of public opinion into government 
business, who appointed and empowered the individual members of these policy 
implementation groups.122 Defence matters were considered especially sensitive because 
of national security imperatives, and as a result defence policy working groups were kept 
especially opaque. With little oversight or transparency, these elite groups maintained an 
advantage over the other larger forces at work in the negotiated transition. Some ANC 
members who were excluded from this part of the process believed the very existence of 
the working groups undermined the spirit of the transition process. This reinforced 
suspicion of elite and sheltered conclaves even among transitional authorities themselves.  
 
What was termed the ‘sunshine clause’ served as perhaps the best, or most notorious, 
example of the secret nature of these working groups’ operations. When it was revealed 
in 1992 that the NP and ANC had negotiated, in secret, a resolution that determined the 
future of the military, an outcry ensued.123 This clause introduced the terms that allowed 
all members of the Apartheid SADF, civilians included, to retain their current positions 
once the new democratically elected government assumed power.   
 
The ANC responded to criticism by asserting that this compromise – hatched entirely in 
secret – was necessary in order to ensure stability during the national election.124 The fact 
that governing elites managed to keep the incursion of public sentiment at bay for so 
long, as argued at the beginning of this chapter, is a factor that partially helps to explain 
why negotiations were ultimately successful.  
 
Defence Force Policy in the Interim Constitution  
 
The interim Constitution of 1993 represented the culmination of the myriad defence 
interests laid out in this chapter, and was one of the greatest advances towards democracy 
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made by the De Klerk administration. It also became a hallmark of the pre-integration 
planning period. The draft text itself materialized in the form of the Republic of SA 
Constitution Act of 1993 (and the document itself was slated to take effect in April of the 
following year, 1994).125 It provided a blueprint for the subsequent permanent standing 
constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and as such heralded an era of not only 
democracy and equality of all citizens before the law, but what came to be called the birth 
of a new nation.126 The interim Constitution contained many provisions relevant to the 
military and their future position vis-à-vis the new government’s non-military authorities, 
and this section will single out some of the most important ones for consideration.  
 
The document included several critical elements that underpinned the new military’s 
structure and ethos. These included South Africa’s first ever Bill of Rights,127 the 
codification of civilian supremacy over the defence forces (accomplished via 15 line-
items contained in section 82)128 and a stipulation that it remain non-partisan. During the 
height of Apartheid little existed by way of legal infrastructure to check or constrain 
executive and legislative power; concentrations of power and political muscle tended to 
remain relatively fluid within and between these two branches of government. These 
three elements of the interim Constitution were intended to redress some of the 
fundamental inequalities (related to the defence forces) that had prevailed under the 
Apartheid regime.  
 
Another element of the interim Constitution that bore consequences for the military is a 
section on administrative law whose relevance to the military is not always considered by 
scholars, but nonetheless deserves attention. The proposal this author offers is that in the 
process of ‘codifying civilian supremacy,’129 the drafters of the interim Constitution also 
assured that executive and legislative-level negotiations would retain the ability to 
significantly impact the defence forces.  
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Administrative law, according to the interim document, would be equally potent in the 
new democratic government. In fact, in light of the broad spectrum of goals and 
aspirations laid out in the interim Constitution, emerging administrative bodies would be 
called upon to plan and implement rules and procedures perhaps more than ever before, 
and this fact would impact the military. “Administrative law will certainly play a key role 
in South Africa’s immediate future … In the new South Africa there will be rule making 
and adjudication in abundance. New agencies will spring to life, [and] old ones will be 
pruned.”130  
 
 Likewise the military of the new South Africa would be granted a specific mandate, but 
its operational capacities would depend upon a national government to empower and 
sustain it (in terms of both budget authorization and public perceptions of legitimacy). In 
light of the political wrangling that marked the military’s early transition period, the 
emergent structure would need to prove itself subservient to the cooler heads of policy 
makers and civil servants. In this way the interim Constitution of 1993 ended decades of 
political control of the defence forces and heralded a new era in which legitimate and 
lawful policy would rule the day.131 
 
The exertion of influence by universities and NGOs, traditionally the arbiters of more 
progressive notions of democratic practices than their political and military 
contemporaries, served as a counterweight to the elite who managed this military 
integration process. Publications in academic journals, newspapers, and in the 
international press laid out alternative visions for South Africa’s military, and appeared 
frequently during the early 1990s. Sandy Africa’s assessment of the ‘primacy of political 
actors’132 in the transition remains accurate, in the sense that this information did not 
necessarily manifest itself in a quantifiable manner during military negotiations. 
However, it did contribute to the overall tone and tenor of the discussions. It was one 
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element that managed to intrude upon and actually affect the political agendas of 
governing elites.133  
 
The role of South Africa’s civil society in the military’s transition, while not as 
influential as in the broader political transformation, was nonetheless fairly significant. 
Thanks in large part to the strength and vibrancy of the country’s proliferation of 
academic and non-governmental organizations, the interests of South Africa’s vast civil 
society manifested itself in military doctrine produced during the transition.  
 
The Impact of Integrative Negotiation 
 
As has been shown, both sides demonstrated a strong willingness to negotiate mutually 
beneficial agreements that they could in turn tout as successes to their respective 
constituencies. The ANC conceded to the SADF on certain issues in order to increase 
their prospects of achieving their long-term goals. In particular, the ANC's willingness to 
maintain certain structural, financial, and mission-related components of the SADF 
ensured that South Africa's new national defence force would remain intact in the short 
term and progressively transform into a racially representative, civilian controlled army 
in the long term. The three-phase integration plan and the interim Constitution serve as 
practical examples of how the ANC sacrificed short term advances in the interest of 
guaranteeing continued progress and the achievement of their future objectives. 
 
The interim Constitution was designed with a long-term focus. Though it would 
eventually be repealed and replaced by a permanent standing Constitution, it was 
designed by its authors to provide a foundation for this later iteration. It bore many 
passages that were later duplicated in the permanent version. There is no room for doubt 
about the fact that the constitution’s authors intended its proscriptions to be enduring; 
when they laid out the contours of an emergent civilian led military, free from political 
interference and the shackles of special legislative interests, they expected these elements 
to stand the test of time. 
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Integrative	  Negotiation	  Strategies 
 
Two specific strategies - employed by the major parties in the planning phase and by the 
GNU in the first phase – largely account for the efficacy of the transition process. First, 
the governing entities maintained broad objectives, rather than specific ones, in order to 
ensure that symbolic progress continued to define the process and allow for difficult and 
contested issues to be sorted out over time. Second, the governing entities kept the 
number of participants at the proverbial decision-making table small and isolated from 
the public at-large to limit the potential for specific debates and public discontent to 
derail programs. 
 
The discussions between Nelson Mandela and NP leadership that resulted in the 
unbanning of the ANC and PAC are best classified as integrative negotiations and are 
characterized by opaque proceedings and exclusivity. Both the ANC and NP ruling party 
relied on keeping these meetings hidden from the public as a means to limit outside 
influence upon proceedings. They also both had interest in keeping participation limited. 
These discussions were exploratory in nature, for neither party knew with absolute 
certainty what the entire range of possible outcomes was.134 Integrative bargaining 
ultimately produced an outcome in which both parties perceived the results to be worse 
than their best-case scenario, but better than the worst. For the NP this meant formal 
recognition of their political rival (worse than the best case, in which they would continue 
to deny the ANC’s legitimacy) but continuation of their tenuous and illegitimate hold on 
government power (better than the worst case in which they would be driven out 
completely). Conversely, the ANC gained legitimacy (better than the worst case) but had 
to accept a situation in which the NP still controlled the government.  
 
The terms of the Groote Schuur Minute highlight the advantages incurred by both parties 
to the negotiations by way of securing broad, interest-based agreement. It set forth some 
general parameters for the commencement of negotiations over defence matters, though it 
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was consequential in that it set forth goals rather than immediate requirements.135 In the 
Minute, the parties decided to postpone agreement on specific defence matters further 
down the road and stipulated very little for the near term; in short, it was symbolic more 
than substantive. The Pretoria Minute negotiators also relied upon integrative negotiating 
tactics that produced a win-win outcome for each party. For MK, the most immediate 
gain was the promised release of Nelson Mandela from prison along with much of the 
ANC’s leadership. And for the SADF it was the end of the ANC’s guerilla warfare 
strategy.  
	  
The NPA’s negotiators employed integrative negotiating tactics in order to achieve a win-
win outcome further on in the future. The ANC maintained broad rather than specific 
objectives throughout the multiparty conference, and emphasized consensus building 
among participants. It gave all parties greater confidence that these conferences could in 
fact yield agreements, and this confidence building measure in turn infused the transition 
with momentum and paved the way for CODESA.136  
	  
The CODESA meetings and the TEC Act were characterized by broad agreements among 
disparate parties intended to sustain the military transition’s momentum and prepare it for 
productive negotiations. CODESA’s main purpose was to unite the ANC, PAC and 
AZAPO as much as possible prior to the first official round of direct negotiations with 
the government, which underscores its commitment to broad and longer-term objectives. 
The TEC Act established a new transitional governing body that, if successful, could later 




Integrative negotiating by the major parties involved, particularly the ANC, played an 
integral role in the creation of the SANDF and the subsequent military transition. The 
apparent irreconcilability of the seven disparate armies – four homeland militaries, two 
insurgent groups, and one dominant, racially distinct military – diminished over time and 
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gave way to a defence landscape in 1994 that was more disposed towards integration than 
had previously been thought possible. This chapter has analyzed the key events that 
transpired during the planning phase of the military transition, and identified the 
strategies that participants employed in pursuit of their goals. It has also considered the 
impact that these strategies had upon the final agreements reached. 
 
This chapter has emphasized two of the primary factors that contributed to and sustained 
the momentum that negotiations enjoyed during their early months. The first is that both 
sides opted for symbolic progress over substantive progress, at least on matters in the 
public domain, in order to allow for the harder decisions to be reached later on (when the 
time was prescient). The second factor was that governing elites established both formal 
and informal committees and tasked them with managing the more challenging issues of 
the day, such as problems the primary negotiators couldn’t resolved quickly and sticking 
points that were contentious an unpalatable.  
 
The functional capacity of the state was at stake amidst a political climate that can be 
described as tenuous at best. Eventually, both sides would be compelled to move beyond 













	   48	  




This chapter focuses on the integration itself. It examines the period spanning the 
beginning of 1994, through the establishment of the SANDF alongside the nation’s first 
democratic elections, to 1996, when the first phase of integration was expected to reach 
its conclusion.   
 
The first section provides a historical overview of the period, with particular emphasis on 
the weeks preceding national elections. During this time the formerly opposed parties 
(the ANC and SADF), pursued an integration approach in which the SADF military 
structure remained largely intact, in exchange for their loyalty to the new government. 
This constituted a significant concession by the ANC and highlights the impact that an 
integrative negotiating strategy had on South Africa’s military transition at large.  
 
The second section provides analysis of the implementation of the three-phase military 
transition plan and highlights some of the key concessions the ANC made in exchange 
for military stability and other long-term objectives. The third section examines the 
primary challenges that surfaced during this early phase of the transition and posits that 
they resulted – either directly or indirectly – from concessions and compromises wrought 
by both sides in the interest of sustaining the process and acquiring either short or long 
term gains.  
 
The chapter concludes that both sides willingly relinquished some of their priorities in the 
interest of achieving broader objectives. In the interest of maintaining a peaceful 
transition, the ANC relinquished short-term control over the military in exchange for old 
guard allegiances, while the SADF asked for structural continuity knowing that in the 
long run they would lose their majority status. Though the SANDF's early development 
was fraught with challenges, the process ultimately served both parties’ interests and, 
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most importantly, never completely broke down, a remarkable achievement given the 
fragile state of the nation at the time.  
 
Historical Account: 1994 through 1996 
 
Since the beginning of direct talks between the armed forces of the ANC and the South 
African Government at Simonstown in 1993,137 debate about the composition of the new 
defence force resounded throughout the halls of Parliament and the Executive Branch.138 
By early 1994 the ‘primary protagonists’ had been identified,139 the Transitional 
Executive Council (TEC) and its three sub-councils tasked with overseeing the defence 
transition process had been established, and the stage was set for integration to 
commence. During this period of the transformation process, the SADF, MK, APLA and 
four homeland defence forces (TDF, CDF, VDF and BDF) were combined into a unified 
command structure and rebranded as the SANDF. 
 
By 1994 planning for the military transformation was complete,140 the Interim 
Constitution (discussed in the previous chapter) came into effect,141 and both sides – the 
SADF and the ANC - recognized the need to maintain momentum and stability. Both 
parties had a stake in ensuring that political progress translated into progress for the 
defence forces as well.  
 
As the planning phase ended abruptly and gave way to the reality of a new military in 
1994, the SANDF took shape and its contours became apparent.142 This presented a new 
spectrum of challenges for the ANC and the interim government. As with many other 
South African organizations born during the country’s transition in both the public and 
private sectors, the new SANDF that emerged from the planning phase proved to be in 
some ways what its architects had envisioned. However, once operational, the SANDF 
also bore numerous unforeseen challenges. 
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The Final Weeks of Planning 
 
Even though there were only a few months separating the dawn of 1994 and South 
Africa’s first-ever democratic national elections, they were eventful months with serious 
implications for the military’s future. During the immediate run-up to April, negotiations 
between the SADF and MK intensified. They remained largely a closed-door affair, 
managed by leaders from the parties’ highest ranks, and in this sense they mirrored the 
larger macro-level political negotiations taking place between the NP and ANC.143  
 
One of the most consequential decisions undertaken by the SADF and MK at this time 
was that the SADF, for a myriad of reasons, would underwrite the military’s transition. In 
exchange for this, the opposition agreed to delay the bulk of the major restructuring that 
the SANDF would need in order to achieve racial representativeness. 144 The result of this 
agreement was that the SADF’s architecture and command structure remained intact, and 
the bodies of the other armies were essentially grafted onto it.145 “Given the cultural 
hegemony, administrative monopoly and exclusive ownership of material resources of 
the former SADF, government initially feared that its culture and methodology would 
remain dominant in the contemporary national defence force. Four years after the start of 
transformation, some of the smaller integrating forces were consequently still of the 
opinion that they were being absorbed by the SADF, rather than being equitably 
integrated into a new defence organisation.”146  
 
Once MK and the independent armies had submitted registers containing the names and 
ranks of proposed personnel to the GNU, they required verification by the SADF.147 
After this part of the process was complete and the junior and senior ranks were 
distinguished from one another, those individuals with unsatisfactory levels of experience 
were required to undertake mandatory bridge training.148 The intended purpose of this 
training was straightforward; to bring those less qualified soldiers up to speed and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Wood (1996): 387-99  
144 Wood (1996): 92 
145 Wood (1996): 93 
146 Louw and Esterhuyse (2014) 
147 Department of Defence Annual Report (1996). 
148 South Africa Survey 1996-7. (1996-97)  
	   51	  
establish a semblance of standardization across the entire organization. The more senior 
members of the opposition armies were merged with their rank equivalents in the SADF 
without being subjected to additional training.149  
 
In response to the SANDF’s imposition of mandatory bridge training, the Transkei and 
Bophuthatswana armies executed a series of rank promotions just prior to the elections, 
leaving both bodies bereft of junior ranking soldiers. Once the SADF became aware of 
these promotions, they seized on them as an opportunity to decry the former opposition’s 
lack of ethics and tout its own history of professionalism. As a result, the legitimacy that 
the homeland armies had worked so diligently to establish was poisoned.150 The 
promotion fiasco ultimately undermined the opposition. By trying to avoid what they 
believed were unfair penalties in the form of training and demotions for non-SADF 
members only, the former opposition reacted rashly and unintentionally damaged their 
credibility. This in turn further bolstered the SADF’s moral high ground. 
 
The Three Phases of Military Transformation   
 
Integration: the First Phase 
 
The name given to the first phase of the transformation process was integration. So called 
because it represented the induction of guerrilla and non-statutory forces into the new 
defence force, this was a watershed period that set the proverbial train of transformation 
into motion. Integration's commencement coincided with the first general election, and 
thus President Mandela assumed office in tandem with the new SANDF and 
simultaneously became its commander in chief.151 
 
The most immediate consequence of integration was the SANDF’s outsized military 
roster. Forecasted projections about troop levels had varied throughout the run-up to 
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integration. In the end, the military gained approximately 15,000 new members (or put 
another way, 15,000 people were added to the existing SADF).152 
 
Two oversight committees managed this phase, one a military and the other 
parliamentary. The former was called the Integration Committee and served primarily 
implementation purposes. The latter was the Integration Oversight Committee and 
represented all legislative interests and equities in this process.153 
 
Another important development during this phase was the siphoning off of excess 
personnel via voluntary discharge. Government planners correctly suspected that at least 
a small percentage of personnel would choose early retirement benefits, if offered, over 
continued service in the new SANDF. Thus, retirement packages were offered freely 
during this first phase.154 
 
Once the desired consortium of former statutory and non-statutory members was reached, 
and the racial diversity of the country was more proportionately represented, the 
integration phase could be brought to a close.155  
 
Demobilization: the Second Phase 
 
Following integration was the demobilization phase in which the government sought the 
voluntary elimination of those service members deemed ‘unfit’ by the new SANDF. The 
government’s explanations as to decisions about unfit designations varied, though 
generally revolved around perceived deficiencies in individuals’ talents, skills, or 
capacities.156 Physical and mental disabilities and advanced age were also offered as 
justification for demobilization. The primary goal of this phase was the elimination of 
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SANDF members who were, in multitudinous ways, less desirable for the service than 
their healthy and age appropriate peers.157  
 
Though this period’s practices may have seemed harsh or contrary to the prevailing 
democratic spirit, they were necessary in order to achieve a viable new defence force.158 
The intention motivating demobilization was not the removal of individuals who wished 
to remain in service, but was rather provision of services and benefits to those who would 
otherwise be unable to afford retirement.  
 
The remuneration aspect of this phase was viewed as favoring the former guerrilla 
fighters, who the SANDF authorities anticipated would ultimately receive the lion’s share 
of available benefits.159 Compensation packages for these individuals would be based 
upon calculations involving age, length of service, and feasibility of entrance into the 
civilian workforce. These remuneration policies that favored the ANC were actually an 
extension of their strategic objectives for the future of the new military. Keeping the 
former non-statutory guerrilla fighters content with the terms of their departure and 
simultaneously maintaining a force that the SADF’s old guard was comfortable with  
reduced the chances of defection on both sides.160 
 
“Because of its voluntary nature, the demobilization phase is the relatively painless 
aspect of force streamlining. An estimated 10,000 former guerillas are expected to opt for 
demobilization.”161 The government projected completion of this phase by the end of 
1996.  
 
Rationalization: the Third Phase 
 
Phase three of the military transformation was rationalization, and was motivated by the 
necessity of aligning the SANDF with the new military posture of democratic South 
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Africa. Primarily, this would consist of another round of streamlining, or cutbacks, 
intended to right size the force to approximately 70,000. This precise number was 
determined internally by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and was subsequently circulated 
for agreement among other government offices.162  
 
It was understood from the outset that this phase would take a heavier toll on former 
members of the SADF because of racial designations, and that because of the complexity 
inherent in this process the time allotted for rationalization was considerably longer than 
the other phases.163 Initial estimates projected the completion of this phase by years end 
in 2000.164 
 
During this period the government would not only have to complete right sizing and 
finalize a racially representative military, it would also have to identify precisely what the 
nation’s new defence posture would be with respect to the international community. At 
the dawn of South Africa’s democratic age, the prevailing military posture suddenly 
seemed outdated. It would need to give way to a more modern conception of state 
sovereignty and priorities.165 The specific policies that would drive this forward were not 
yet known, however, in the mid 1990s. 
 
A surprising aspect of the third phase of this plan was that the government, in a complete 
state of flux and uncertainty, believed with some degree of certainty that it could put 
forward a comprehensive new posture with accompanying guidelines within only a few 
years. The difficulty the new SANDF faced, in its quest to make old structures 
accommodate the new political reality, served as a microcosm of the new government’s 
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Challenges During the Post-Election Period 
 
The first problem that the SANDF confronted as a new organization was one of numbers. 
Specifically, a disparity between estimates of troops to be put forward by the SADF and 
the opposition militias for incorporation into the new force. As of May 1994, the SADF 
put forward 90,000 people, MK 22,000 people, the APLA 6,000 people, and the TVBC a 
combined total of 11,000 people.166 Given this imbalance, it was immediately obvious 
that the prospects for achieving and maintaining true integration would remain dire 
without heavy-handed government intervention in the form of legislation, policy 
implementation, and oversight to rebalance the military’s proportions. To complicate this 
matter further, it turned out that the estimated figures for the TVBC militaries were 
inaccurate, and the number of soldiers who actually came forward for integration was 
unexpectedly high.167 This was due in large part to the fact that many individuals came 
forward to enroll in the new SANDF who had previously served in unofficial township 
self-defence units and thus were not included in the original estimates. 
 
Without the exertion of equalizing forces upon the military, it appeared that the new 
SANDF would remain hostage to the SADF majority. Given that a racially, ethnically, 
and economically diverse SANDF was, as of the recent national elections, a political 
mandate, this status quo was not a viable option. Thus from the outset, from the very 
moment the SADF was statutorily dissolved and the new government assumed power in 
April of 1994, the SANDF was beleaguered by fundamental, intrinsic challenges that the 




The ranking process implemented by SANDF authorities was complicated from the 
outset by the divergent backgrounds of the troops, those between MK soldiers in 
particular. While some of the MK members put forward had received extensive training 
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overseas (approximately 10,000 of them) and were highly qualified to serve in various 
capacities in the SANDF, others enjoyed no formal training whatsoever. The range of 
talent, capabilities, and qualifications among service members from the SANDF was so 
vast and so staggered that deciphering any level of standardization proved to be a 
tremendous task.168 
 
Those who entered the SANDF from MK’s senior ranks, having served both inside South 
Africa and overseas, tended to have significant amounts of training for formal military 
operations and in asymmetric warfare techniques. As they returned to South Africa from 
camps scattered across the world, however, these soldiers were not nearly as 
homogenized as their former SADF peers. A small percentage had travelled to host 
countries in the Soviet Union to participate in programs there.	  An even smaller number 
had undertaken specialized courses in India. Much of the remaining soldiers from the 
senior ranks had received training in other African nations such as Tanzania and 
Angola.169  
 
Between the various TVBC armies, the qualifications of members put forward were fairly 
homogeneous by comparison, in that most soldiers had received very little, if any, formal 
training at all (with the exception of a handful who had undertaken courses in Libya).170 
As a result, some ninety percent of the soldiers put forward by the TVBC militaries were 
assigned to the SANDF Army,171 the branch with the lowest barrier to entry. 
 
The bridge training outlined in the previous section of this paper proved to be another 
point of contention between the SADF and non-statutory armies. As MK and TVBC 
soldiers found themselves mired in training requirements that took up significant amounts 
of time and further delayed their official entry into SANDF, their resentment grew.172 
Despite the fact that the bridge training was intended to act as an equalizing force among 
the troops, its effects proved to be perversely segregating. Many soldiers forced to 
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undergo additional training perceived it as burdensome, and believed it was a penalty 
imposed in exchange for their nefarious political affiliations. Conversely, a small group 
of former SADF soldiers felt that these military courses unfairly advantaged former MK 
soldiers by preparing them for promotion and advancement, and that they represented a 
significant investment of resources by the SANDF in these particular individuals.173 
 
This tension and antipathy eventually reached a boiling point when MK troops at a 
military camp in Pretoria revolted and thousands of soldiers simultaneously deserted their 
base on 1 November 1994.174 
 
Though the ANC found this episode problematic and extremely undesirable, it was also a 
far cry from their perceived worst-case scenario, which was one in which former SADF 
officers ousted from military service took up arms against the new military or 
mutinied.175 Had the new military not retained large numbers of former SADF personnel 
and soldiers, the prospect for a large-scale revolt, or even civil war, would have been 
much greater. Thus, one plausible explanation for the fact that the ANC did not work 
harder to immediately extinguish the mounting tension over this issue is strategic. Since 
their primary goal was to prevent mutiny by the former SADF faction, the ANC was 
focused on keeping them content and hence less concerned with the dissatisfaction of the 
military’s other contingents. 
 
Uneven Racial Representation Among Ranks 
 
Adding further to the severe training and skills imbalance between former SADF and 
non-statutory forces was the hemorrhaging of black South African soldiers from the 
upper echelons of the SANDF.176 The loss of a significant proportion of the most senior 
and most skilled black soldiers occurred, and was primarily due to two factors: the first 
being that the new government in power recruited heavily from the pool of former MK 
fighters for non-military positions, and the second the government’s introduction of the 
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Voluntary Severance Initiative. Once both of these initiatives entered into effect later in 
the year, the deficit of senior black service members was exaggerated even further, with 
the result that white males were overly represented in the mid to upper ranks (Major 
through Colonel, to be precise).177 
PROPOSED RECOMPOSITION OF THE SANDF178 
Source Actual Proposed 
SADF 64,516 37,756 
MK 11,919 10,604 
APLA 4,239 4,122 
Homeland Armies 9,108 8,461 
KwaZulu SPFs 1,459 1,958 
Civilians 8,422 7,795 
Totals 99,663 70,699 
In 1995 the Chief of the SANDF Army, Johan Pretorius, remarked that: “Integration 
means taking separate entities and joining them together to form a totally new one … It 
must also be visible at all levels of the command structure if it is to be successful. The 
importance of the appointment of senior officers within the SANDF therefore outrivals 
senior appointments within any other state department.”179 Unfortunately, and in spite of 
Pretorius’ sentiment, the appointment of senior officers within the SANDF did not 
ultimately trump the staffing needs of the various Executive Branch departments and 
agencies. Throughout this period the SANDF suffered the continual loss of senior 
officers from the former non-statutory militaries, as they departed the armed services in 
order to assume civilian posts and accept political appointments with the new government 
in power.  
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The Mandela Administration’s cabinet leaders often prioritized the staffing of their own 
offices over that of others, including the SANDF. Career and appointment employment 
opportunities for blacks at all levels of the government abounded after the 1994 elections, 
when the ANC found itself responsible for satisfying the personnel requirements of three 
entire branches of government, including the Judiciary. Members of the former 
opposition in particular were highly sought after by virtually all civilian agencies because 
of their proven loyalty to the new regime, as well as their qualifications and 
competency.180 Many of MK’s senior members –such as President Mandela himself – 
were lawyers, academics, and skilled industrialists by trade, and had enjoyed successful 
careers prior to joining the anti-Apartheid struggle as combatants. The combination of 
these attributes made them desirable candidates to the new government, which sought 
more than anything to live up to the expectations that accompanied its ascendancy to 
power.  
This bolsters the point made earlier in this chapter that President Mandela and the ANC 
leadership believed a worst case scenario for the nation was one in which members of the 
former SADF mutinied and instigated large scale civil unrest. The ANC would have an 
easier time of retaining SADF loyalty if they conceded to at least some of their demands 
in the short term, and so this became a priority for the new government. The former non-
statutory officers who departed the armed services for civilian appointments were, by 
contrast, virtually guaranteed to remain loyal to the new government and so a scenario in 
which they departed voluntarily – even though more left than the ANC would have liked 
– was preferable to the alternative. Le Roux (2005) says of these problems, "Many of
these difficulties were inevitable given the political and logistical complexities of
merging forces."181
The Voluntary Severance Initiative was a program offered to members of the former non-
statutory forces who, for various reasons, preferred to discontinue their military service 
with the SANDF. On the one hand the program was advantageous, as it provided a viable 
180 Mandela (1994): 481-486 
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departure route in the form of once-off payments (these generally varied between 12,000 
and R42,000 per individual), and ultimately helped the SANDF get much closer to 
achieving its goals for demobilization than it otherwise would have.182 In practice, 
however, the program had the unintended and disadvantageous consequence of further 
diminishing the SANDF’s goals for racial distribution and representation. 
Most of the soldiers who opted for severance did so in order to join the new civilian 
government workforce or because they didn’t meet the SANDF requirements for active 
duty. They were elderly, suffered disabilities, lacked education necessary for officer 
status, or because they hadn’t intended to remain in the military after Apartheid ended. A 
striking number of MK soldiers, both officers and non-commissioned, opted out.183 
All of this resulted in the unfortunate reality that, at least during the first few post-
Apartheid years, the SANDF would remain plagued by uneven racial distribution among 
its ranks as well as between its branches of service.  
 
Educational Imbalance and Literacy 
 
The body of the SANDF that remained after the implementation of the Voluntary 
Severance Initiative was comprised of soldiers whose educational backgrounds, just like 
their combat and training experience, varied greatly among ranks as well as along 
political lines. The fact that the former SADF members tended to be white meant that 
they generally had enjoyed a greater degree of access to formal academic education in 
South Africa during Apartheid than their colleagues from MK and the other non-statutory 
militias. This disparity was not just in terms of the quality of education and degree of 
qualification achieved by individuals; many of the former non-statutory forces had never 
received any academic education whatsoever prior to enlisting. This fault line was clearly 
visible from the very outset of the SANDF’s creation, and its consequences reverberated 
throughout the organization. 
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The first detrimental consequence to the new force was flagging literacy rates. As the 
result of the prevailing education imbalance, literacy rates among the former non-
statutory forces were abysmal. Only the most senior of the opposition soldiers had 
received an academic education beyond grade school, and an even smaller select few had 
completed tertiary studies. Thus, the gap between MK’s senior and junior soldiers was so 
profound that it rivaled that between former statutory and non-statutory forces.184 This 
presented a whole host of problems from an operational perspective, including 
communications, command and control mechanisms, and prospects for organizational 
unity. 
From a macro organizational standpoint, the educational imbalance meant that the 
majority of non-statutory force members were not eligible for officer status, a reality that 
confined them to the lower ranks of the new SANDF and restricted their potential for 
future professional growth. “On account of educational limitations, a large proportion of 
members of the non-statutory forces were not eligible to gain any rank above that of 
private within the reconstituted force whatsoever.”185 This policy had the effect of 
formalizing the divide between the former statutory and non-statutory forces, with the 
most senior ranks populated by former SADF officers and the lower ranks by the 
opposition. Only a handful of MK soldiers emerged from the transition with positions in 
the new military’s senior ranks.  
A net shortage of skilled staff officers on the whole also persisted. The new SANDF, 
born on the heels of the Apartheid era military, had to adapt to confront the new socio-
political climate in South Africa.186 Far from concerning itself with conventional warfare 
exclusively, the new defence force had to learn how to function during peacetime187 and 
also serve as an arbiter of that peace (as a regional powerbroker across southern Africa). 
Thus, not only did the SANDF find itself with an inherent education imbalance, whereby 
the former non-statutory forces suffered a severe deficit by comparison with their former 
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SADF peers; it also faced the immediate prospect of being unprepared to fulfill its (new) 
peacetime mandate.188 
Language Barrier 
Another obstacle to immediate and authentic integration was the issue of language. With 
the various militias that comprised the SANDF speaking approximately 14 different 
languages, the written and spoken word quickly became an issue of contention.189 As 
with education and literacy, the divide on this issue came down primarily between 
members of the former SADF and those of the former non-statutory defence forces. 
The former non-statutory soldiers integrated into the SANDF spoke an assortment of 
languages, primarily Xhosa, Zulu, and English. The former SADF, on the other hand, had 
for decades relied upon Afrikaans as the primary lingua franca for day-to-day operations. 
Everything from service contracts, training manuals, and command and control guides 
were printed accordingly in that language, and it was the language of choice for drills on 
bases and command centers throughout the country. Additionally, and perhaps more 
significantly, it was the language soldiers had used to communicate with one another on a 
daily basis since the establishment of the SADF in 1957.190 
When integration occurred, former SADF members – who constituted a majority -
continued this long-standing practice despite the fact that English was the obvious 
common denominator for the new body. The former opposition forces who came from 
around the country had varying degrees of prior exposure to English, and most of the 
Afrikaners who remained had been required to study it at one point or another during the 
course of their academics. Much to the chagrin and detriment of the former opposition 
who was now part of the new military, the exclusive use of Afrikaans persisted. This 
practice created a tangible barrier between those conversant in the language and those 
who were not. 
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Pervasiveness of the ‘Old-Guard’ Mentality 
 
The old-guard mentality that pervaded the new SANDF and was particularly pronounced 
during its initial years proved to be a severe impediment to progress during this period. 
Throughout the planning and initial implementation phases of integration a particular 
conservative faction rose to prominence within the SANDF that propagated an elite, 
white, boys club culture and remained psychologically opposed to the advent of racial 
equality and the incorporation of former opposition armies into South Africa’s 
military.191 This group was not any sort of official entity but rather found its strength in 
the subliminal collectivity of dissident thought and belief, and was more covertly cultural 
in nature. This group was not officially sanctioned (its raison d’etre was unconstitutional 
and it represented only a small minority of the SANDF’s overall population) but its 
influence upon the SANDF as a whole was nonetheless profound.192 
 
The champion of this culture was none other than General George Meiring, the SANDF’s 
inaugural Chief, whose personal beliefs and political agenda fueled and sustained the 
group’s resistance to the legitimization and inclusion of the former non-statutory soldiers 
in the SANDF.193 Its members were primarily former SADF officers, Botha/National 
Party loyalists who had collectively risen to prominence during Apartheid; some had 
even been members of the Afrikaner Broederbond that had sought to destabilize the 
country during the run up to national elections in the early 1990s.194  
 
This element within the new defence force sought to undermine transformation at every 
turn, and for several years actually successfully prevented meaningful reform. By 
perpetuating rather than seeking to alleviate the challenges the new military faced, to 
include training, skills, educational and racial imbalances within ranks, this group 
inflicted detrimental damage upon the cultural foundation of the SANDF. 
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It wasn’t until 1998 that the true nature of the group became known outside of military 
circles and its form and function came under official government fire. In the early part of 
1998, General Meiring submitted a report to President Mandela outlining a strange 
conspiracy theory by his political opponents so poorly crafted and without legitimacy that 
it ultimately undermined his credibility with the administration and lead him to resign his 
post before he completed his term.195 
The cultural and psychological influence of the old guard mentality within the new 
SANDF was also in a certain sense inevitable. Though perhaps difficult for the ANC and 
other former non-statutory members to endure, the old guard persisted in large part 
because the ANC’s military leadership allowed it to. As laid out earlier in the study, the 
SADF’s number were dominant and the ANC hoped to avoid mutiny at all costs. Thus, 
all of the problems laid out in this section – racial inequality, education imbalances and 
uneven literacy rates – would have to be fixed gradually, over time, as part of the 
transformation process.  
The Mission and Budgetary Debates 
During this period major consideration was given to the new military’s budgetary 
requirements and priorities for the near to medium-term future. As is the case in many 
post-conflict societies, South Africa faced dual imperatives: it had to reconstitute its 
national identity while simultaneously maintaining defence of its territorial integrity.196 In 
light of the military’s integration and its attendant structural changes, the annual budget 
for defence spending had to be reconsidered. The advent of democracy in South Africa, 
too, carried its own requirements for reconfiguration of defence priorities. 
The Interim Constitution was clear that the SANDF should seek to be a “balanced, 
modern and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its functions in 
terms of this Constitution.”197 This directive left little room for interpretation but was 
nevertheless construed differently by the SANDF’s former SADF and ANC members, 
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who retained disparate alternative visions for the military. While the former camp was 
focused almost exclusively on the acquisition of modern defence technologies as the 
surest path towards modernization, the latter believed that, conversely, investment in 
personnel and human resources (of both civilian staff and soldiers) should trump 
technological acquisition. For the most part, it was former SADF members – current 
SANDF officers – who favored increased defence acquisitions, while the ANC and 
members of the former non-statutory militaries supported increased budgeting for 
personnel requirements.198 
Resolution: the Defence White Paper and Defence Secretariat 
In 1995 two seminal events in the early history of the SANDF prodded these debates 
towards an early, if not lasting, resolution.199 The first was the drafting of the Defence 
White Paper, which commenced in June and concluded less than one year later (in May 
of 1996).200 The second major event was the creation of the Defence Secretariat, which 
occurred via passage of the Defence Amendment Act of the same year.201 The department 
was to be headed by a civilian officer whose role vis a vis the head of the SANDF was 
left purposefully undefined.202 
The White Paper laid out the new dimensions of the SANDF on paper, both its size and 
scope, defined its strategic and tactical goals, and a rationale for its existence in light of 
the fact that South Africa faced no evident external threats.203 Here, the introduction of 
the human security paradigm (introduced in this study’s previous chapter) was introduced 
to the South African public in the form of commitments to the protection and 
maintenance of civilian order, as well as general civilian wellbeing. The revolutionary 
principal introduced here was the idea that the military existed primarily to protect the 
198 For further background on why the ANC and former-SADF camps broke down along these lines, refer to Sheldon, Garth & Alden 
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people (South African citizens of all races) and only secondarily to protect the state (both 
its government as well as its borders and sovereign territory).204  
The fact that the White Paper included the protection of the state as a priority at all 
further substantiates one of the core arguments presented in this study; that the ANC 
retained and even in certain instances promoted outdated defence concepts in an effort to 
mollify the SADF old-guard constituency. Defence against external threats remained a 
priority in the White Paper, but its simultaneous introduction of the human security 
paradigm was a direct intimation of what would take priority in the future. 
The matter of budgeting priorities was temporarily resolved via a constitutional inclusion 
inserted by the new ANC majority Parliament in 1996, which effectively determined that 
the government would pursue a more technologically modern military (this was the year 
in which the standing Constitution came into effect and displaced the interim Constitution 
that had been implemented in 1993). 
The Defence Review, which also commenced in 1996, was designed as a means to 
reconsider and reappraise the SANDF’s dimensions as laid out in the White Paper, and 
also to align posture with overarching strategic objectives. The budget debate again 
resurfaced during the review process, when the Department of Defence put forth four 
distinct force posture plans for consideration by its oversight committees. This time 
around the former SADF lobby proved formidable, as SANDF officers used all the power 
and persuasion at their disposal to launch a major campaign advocating for increased 
investment in defence technologies.205 Ultimately, the new government decided that the 
SANDF could not retain its competitive edge without the modern accoutrements of 
warfare, and the matter of the budget was resolved once and for all in favor of the pro-
technology investment camp in May of 1998.206  
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Here again, the ANC made a concession in order to ensure the loyalties of the SADF’s 
old guard, or at the very least ensure that weapons expenditure did not drive a fatal wedge 
between them and black SANDF officers. The ANC did this knowing that in the future 
the continuation of majority rule would allow them to make further changes to the 
budget.  
 
The former-SADF constituency within the new SANDF appeared determined to maintain 
its Apartheid- and Cold War-era offensive capabilities, which enabled it to engage in war 
fighting with external aggressors, despite the fact that these threats no longer existed.207 
 
Accommodating the SADF 
 
Existing SADF structures and procedures exerted heavy influence upon the newly formed 
SANDF. This influence, as discussed earlier in the chapter, was very pronounced, caused 
much dissension among the lower ranks, and served to undermine organizational 
coherence and capacity. The SADF’s cultural imprint upon the new SANDF underscores 
that the ANC conceded in allowing large numbers of SADF soldiers and personnel to be 
put forward for integration and determined they should be siphoned off incrementally 
rather than all at once. Because the SADF had such a large presence in the new military, 
the logical inference is that they would also have a disproportionately large cultural 
influence. This reality created many problems (laid out earlier in the chapter) and the fact 
that these problems persisted underscores the ANC’s concessions. After the April 
elections the ANC sat squarely in the seat of power – executive, legislative and judicial 
(they had a monopoly on the country’s governing bodies and institutions) and so much of 
what transpired after that point was within their ability to control at least to a limited 
extent.208 
 
An additional point is that all of these problems were to a certain extent inevitable, in the 
sense that viable alternative options for the ANC were practically non-existent. The ANC 
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did indeed make many concessions, but all were made in the interest of preventing what 
they viewed as the worst-case scenario: mutiny by the former SADF members and the 
ensuing collapse of the entire military transition process. Thus, from the ANC’s 
perspective, dismantling the SADF entirely was not an option at the time. As long as the 
former SADF members retained employment and believed they were not entirely losing 
their monopoly on military power all at once, the ANC believed the government could 
count on their loyalty and dedication. The former SADF members were for their part 
aware that over time the ANC would gain an increasing hold on the levers of military 
power and that ultimately the tables would turn in their favor.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a conceptual framework for the dynamics at play within the 
SANDF during the South African military’s early integration (1994-1996). It provides a 
historical overview of this period, frames the three-phase transformation process, and 
provides an in-depth look at the major problems that emerged in the aftermath of the 
1994 elections. Examination of the Constitution, the White Paper on Defence, and other 
legislative and executive documents in particular highlight some of the tactical 
concessions made by both sides in the interest of longer term strategic objectives. 
The ANC relinquished its prospects for short-term control and allowed for certain 
inequalities to persist among the military ranks, in exchange for the allegiance of former 
SADF soldiers. The SADF, for its part, asked for continuity of structure, mission and 
financial resources knowing that in the long term they would be phased out and would 
lose majority status. This system was both mutually reinforcing and mutually beneficial 
for the two parties.  
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Against the background of the political reform process that commenced in South Africa 
in the 1990s, a concurrent process of military integration unfolded. The establishment of 
the new SANDF in 1994 represented a watershed moment for the post-Apartheid GNU. 
When the ANC and the F.W. De Klerk administration commenced negotiations, the 
security landscape was dotted with military bodies vying for power.  
 
The new government eventually managed to combine these bodies into a single force 
whose statutory powers and responsibilities were codified in a series of official policy 
and strategy papers, legislation, and in the Constitution itself. These foundation 
documents provided a blueprint for the new SANDF, and provided original guidance as 
to its formation, functioning, and force structure. However, the issues that the SANDF 
faced with regard to integration were not resolvable on paper; compromises wrought 
between the ANC and the SADF influenced the military’s transformation process 
tremendously and were even reflected in its force structure.  
  
The obstacles to integration were many and varied. By 1990, South Africa had seven 
separate armies, all of which needed to be incorporated into a new military. These armies 
were characterized by different cultures, command structures, missions, and sizes, and 
were competing for power in the new order. During the introduction and subsequent 
implementation of integration, the security forces’ posture changed dramatically. The 
military shifted its focus from prioritizing national defence and national security (the 
SADF under the command of P.W. Botha) to a new paradigm that emphasized human 
security, and ni which the traditional concept of national security was expanded and 
military spending was constrained.209 
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Outcomes 
In assessing the military's transformation since the end of Apartheid, Heinecken (2005) 
determines that, "In terms of South Africa, there is no doubt that the SANDF has made 
momentous strides in transforming itself into a Defence Force for the people, and not 
against them."210 However, he also points out that a number of shortcomings plagued the 
process and a number of deficiencies still exist within the current force, acknowledging 
that, "the changes brought about by the transformation process have been massive and 
perhaps too ambitious, as morale and the operational capacity of the SANDF have 
suffered."211 Burgess (2008) arrives at a similarly 'positive with shades of grey' 
conclusion, stating that even though "the quality and effectiveness of the forces had 
deteriorated," the "integration process was complete after nine years," and the old guard 
had "been replaced by a new and more promising generation of troops."212 By and large, 
the literature seems to agree with these assessments. Despite the SANDF’s myriad 
shortcomings, it is important to keep in mind that it was eventually effected and 
subsequently remained intact during an incredibly fragile period in South Africa's history. 
As the previous chapters have shown, this could not have happened without a) the ANC 
and SADF finding satisfactory grounds for mutual benefit during the pre-integration 
phase, and b) the ANC acquiescing to a number of SADF demands during the integration 
phase. The ANC did so in order to maintain old guard loyalty to the new civil 
government and to move the integration process along during the early development of 
South Africa's new military apparatus, knowing that in the long run they would be able to 
enact incremental changes to the military and ensure progress via majority rule. In turn, 
the former SADF leadership was also aware that their days of exerting influence were 
numbered,213 and they opted to trade loyalty to the new regime in exchange for structural, 
financial, and mission-related gains within the SANDF. Some scholars might point to the 
resolve and obstinacy of old guard factions of the SANDF as proof of the former SADF’s 
inflexibility and refusal to negotiate. Specifically, they might highlight the resistance and 
210 Heinecken (2000): 451 
211 p. 94 
212 p. 70 
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subsequent ousting of General Meiring as a manifestation of the larger group's hard-line 
approach once the integration began. Certainly, these were significant obstacles that 
needed to be overcome and they should not be ignored. However, what is even more 
remarkable is the reality that neither mutiny nor dissolution of the armed services 
occurred during this highly tumultuous time, in which former SADF soldiers constituted 
a substantial majority of the new military and could have forced the hand of the new 
government.  
Ultimately, both parties to the negotiated military transition gave up something in the 
short term in order to get something later on, and this strategy proved to be mutually 
beneficial. Such is the nature of integrative negotiations, in which a strategy that pursues 
mutual benefit (in this case, the establishment, integration, and progress of the SANDF) 
wins out over other alternatives. Integrative negotiating also has the added benefit of 
preventing parties to a negotiation from becoming entrenched in their original positions 
and thus inadvertently sacrificing potential mutual gains. 
In addition to broad approaches, specific, tactical means also served to benefit the 
process. Agreements themselves remained broad during this period, such as was the case 
with the Interim Constitution, the Defence White Paper, and the Pretoria and Groote 
Schuur Minutes. Additionally, participation at the proverbial negotiating table was 
severely limited, and all meetings kept out of the public eye until conclusions had been 
reached and were ready to be announced. The negotiating teams were also kept small in 
an effort to limit the potential for delays and hang-ups over details, and to avoid the 
pitfalls that consensus building would have required. The proceedings and meetings of 
the parliamentary committees tasked with oversight of the SANDF serve as prime 
examples of these two phenomenons. 
Broader Implications & Future Areas of Study 
The South African case proves that nations which undertake military transitions, 
particularly those in which disparate competing entities are brought under a single 
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umbrella organization, can greatly improve their prospects for success through the 
employment of specific negotiating strategies. More specifically, this case study 
demonstrates the efficacy of having both negotiating parties identify and focus on areas 
of mutual interest as opposed to drawing red lines in the sand.214  Furthermore, when 
parties to a negotiation confront obstacles or barriers to progress, it can be very helpful 
for them to expand the scope of their perspective and focus on longer-term outcomes (as 
opposed to imminent or shorter term interests). It is possible to forge a path forward (and 
avoid stalling or the collapse of negotiations entirely) by delaying commitments to fulfill 
terms at a designated future point in time.215  It is in precisely this manner that the SADF 
and ANC largely avoided major pitfalls and managed to sustain the trajectory and 
progress of military negotiations throughout the South African military’s transformation. 
The ANC employed this technique, for example, in the instance when the SADF 
demanded inclusion of traditional state-based national security strategy in the Defence 
White Paper. 
The evaluation and application of the hypotheses proposed in this study have contributed 
to a more fulsome understanding of how certain conditions can contribute to successful 
military integration. These hypotheses, however, would benefit greatly from further 
analysis in the form of their application to other cases in other countries, including 
Ukraine. The current push for military integration in Ukraine bears some similarities with 
the South African case study: the Ukrainian Government seeks to right-size its defence 
force in accordance with some severe financial constraints its currently facing, and also to 
implement greater civilian control over the military apparatus at large.216 The Ukrainian 
and South African militaries are also both large by comparison with most of their 
regional neighbors. There are also major differences between the two cases, most notably 
the fact that Ukraine shares a border with Russia and faces the ongoing threat of military 
incursion into its territory by that former superpower, while South Africa stands as a 
regional hegemon and faces no comparable, formidable security adversary.217  
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Ukraine faces obstacles to reform, much like South Africa did in the 1990s, most notably 
dissonance and competition between the defense ministry and the parliamentary bodies 
responsible for military oversight.218 The application of integrative negotiation theory and 
its attendant components here could prove to be especially useful for analysts seeking to 
identify and describe the various alternatives for integration. It will be important for 
Ukraine to be mindful of longer-term security objectives it has vis a vis NATO and its 
European allies as it moves forward with the pursuit of reform. 
A comparative study of negotiation theory applications to military integrations will allow 
scholars to determine under what conditions integrative versus distributive negotiations 
might be beneficial for various nation states. For one, the South African military’s 
integration consisted of relatively minimal foreign assistance and oversight (save for 
some minor British involvement).219 Greater foreign and third party assistance might 
influence both the strategies pursued and outcomes achieved in military transformation 
negotiations in other countries.  
A dearth of literature exists that attempts to analyze the intersection between military 
integration and negotiation theory. If scholars and analysts ultimately seek concrete 
answers about what makes certain military integrations successful, then the scholarship 
needs to continually approach the study of military integrations in new and innovative 
ways, which is precisely what this study has sought to achieve. 
218 Closson (2002) 
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